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Among philosophers, Fregeanism and sententialism are widely considered
two of the leading theories of the semantics of attitude reports. Among
linguists, these approaches have received little recent sustained discussion.
This paper aims to bridge this divide. I present a new formal implementa-
tion of Fregeanism and sententialism, with the goal of showing that these
theories can be developed in sufficient detail and concreteness to be serious
competitors to the theories which are more popular among semanticists. I
develop a modern treatment of quantifying in for Fregeanism and senten-
tialism, in the style of Heim and Kratzer [1998], and then show how these
theories can – somewhat surprisingly – account for “third readings” (Fodor
[1970]) on the model of the “Standard Solution” from possible-worlds se-
mantics (von Fintel and Heim [2002]). The resulting Fregean/sententialist
proposal has a distinctive attraction: it treats data related to counter-
factual attitudes (Ninan [2008], Yanovich [2011], Maier [2015], Blumberg
[2018]) – which have proven challenging to accommodate in the setting of
possible worlds semantics – straightforwardly as third readings.
1 Quantifying in and third readings
In his 1892 paper, “On Sense and Reference”, Frege distinguishes between two
aspects of the meaning of expressions, what they refer to and what they express.
He proposes that when an expression occurs outside the scope of an attitude
verb (as “Hesperus” does in an unembedded use of “Hesperus is bright”), it
refers to its ordinary referent (in this case, the planet Venus), and expresses its
customary sense. But when an expression occurs inside the scope of a single
attitude verb (as “Hesperus” does in an unembedded use of “Plato believed
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Hesperus was bright”) it does not refer to its customary referent, and instead
refers to its customary sense.
This doctrine about “reference-shift” was an important part of Frege’s theory
of the semantics of attitude reports. Frege held that senses are non-concrete
entities, and that the ordinary referents of attitude verbs like “believe” are
relations between people and structured thoughts composed exclusively of these
non-concrete senses. He also held that what a use of a complex expression refers
to is determined by what is referred to by the uses of the elementary expressions
which compose it. These doctrines – about reference-shift, the metaphysics of
senses, the meaning of “believe”, and the composition of what expressions refer
to – provide an elegant treatment of simple attitude reports. They predict, for
example, that “Plato believed Hesperus was bright” is true if and only if Plato
stood in the relation that is the ordinary referent of “believe” (henceforth, the
“belief-relation”) to the structured thought referred to by the use of “Hesperus
was bright” in this sentence. Importantly, Frege’s doctrine about reference-shift
is key to this result. For if “Hesperus” did not refer to a sense in “Plato believed
Hesperus was bright”, then the sentence would be guaranteed to be false or
undefined; no one stands in the belief-relation to entities which have non-senses
as constituents.
But this elegant theory leads to a well-known problem. Consider:
1. There is a planet which Plato believed was bright.
Intuitively the sentence 1 could be true. But it is unclear how Fregeans can
produce this result. The expression “is a planet” plausibly refers to a property,
as does “which Plato believed was bright”. The sentence is true if and only
if something satisfies both of these properties. But Fregeans seem committed
to denying that any entity could. On the one hand, the property referred to
by “is a planet” is satisfied only by concrete entities, and hence not by any
senses. On the other hand, it is natural to think that if an object satisfies the
property expressed by “which Plato believed was bright”, then there could be an
expression α whose relevant occurrence referred to that object in a true use of
pPlato believed α was brightq. Given this natural thought, Fregeans must hold
that the property expressed by “which Plato believed was bright” is satisfied
exclusively by senses. But then 1 must be false: no sense is a planet, and no
planets could be the referent of α in a true use of pPlato believed α was brightq.
This problem for Fregeans arises also for “sententialist” theories, according
to which attitude verbs express relations to sentences (see Quine [1956]). On a
simple-minded sententialist theory, “believe” means “would assent to a salient
translation of”, and the verb takes the expression which is its complement (e.g.
the sentence “Hesperus is bright”) as an argument. According to this theory,
“Plato believed that Hesperus was bright” is true if and only if Plato would
assent to a salient translation of “Hesperus was bright”.1 A flatfooted devel-
opment of this sententialist theory would yield the result that “which Plato
1A popular version of the theory invokes a sentence-like notion of mental representation,
and takes “believe” to mean “accepts a translation of”, where “accept” is a relation to mental
representations (“have in one’s belief box”) and translations include translations into the
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believed was bright” denotes a property of linguistic expressions, and is satis-
fied by those expressions α such that Plato would have assented to a salient
translation of pα is brightq. But this flatfooted idea leads straight to a problem
with 1 similar to the problem for Fregeans. If only linguistic expressions satisfy
the property expressed by “which Plato believed was bright”, then, since no
linguistic expressions are planets, 1 would be false.
These problems are well-known, and there are also well-known outlines of
solutions to them (most importantly Kaplan [1968], cf. Kaplan [1986]). These
outlines involve rejecting the “natural thought” in the case of Fregeans, and
amending the “flatfooted development” in the case of sententialists, so that the
meaning of expressions like “which Plato believed was bright” denote proper-
ties of objects like planets, not properties of senses or expressions. But as Yalcin
[2015] has emphasized, no compositional semantics corresponding to these out-
lines has yet received wide acceptance. Fregeans and sententialists alike should
hope not just for appropriate paraphrases of sentences like 1, but for a sys-
tematic theory of how the meanings of such sentences are produced from the
meanings of their parts: they should hope for a compositional semantics.
The first part of this paper provides a new Fregean (and sententialist) se-
mantics for quantifying in, building on ideas from Bigelow [1978]. The proposal
improves on the most prominent recent proposal for how to give such a Fregean
semantics, due to Yalcin [2015], in several ways. Perhaps most significantly, it
allows Fregeans to treat the de se and the de re in parallel, making good on
a longstanding aspiration of Fregeans (expressed powerfully by Stanley [2011]).
The proposal achieves these results while preserving some of the well-known
attractions of Fregeanism and sententialism, which have made these theories so
popular among philosophers. For instance, it provides a straightforward treat-
ment of Frege’s own puzzle about the substitution of intuitively co-referring
names, as well as Mates’ related puzzle (Mates [1952]), both of which cause
trouble for standard more “coarse-grained” theories.
The second half of the paper turns to a second problem, that of accounting
for “third readings” or “scope paradoxes” (Fodor [1970], Bäuerle [1983]). To
introduce the problem, consider first a simple example. Suppose that Plato be-
lieved that Hesperus was bright, believed that Phosphorus was bright, believed
that Hesperus was not Phosphorus, and believed that no other planets were
bright. Consider:
2. Plato believed exactly one planet is bright.
This sentence has a true reading in our scenario. This reading – on which the em-
bedded quantifier or “determiner” “exactly one” is assessed from the speaker’s
perspective, not from the attitude holder’s – is sometimes called a “de re” read-
ing. Partly to avoid the usual associations of this term, I will call it a transparent
reading (to be contrasted with an opaque reading, sometimes called “de dicto”).2
mental language. (See, e.g. Field [1978] and now Field [2017].) I won’t consider those details
further here; it’s easy to see that the problems I present generalize to that more nuanced
version of the theory.
2There are in fact two distinctions which are run together by the traditional terminology,
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Fregeans and sententialists have a prima facie difficulty producing this trans-
parent interpretation of 2. To the extent that we have an intuitive grip on what
Fregean thoughts Plato is belief-related to, Plato is not be belief-related to the
thought expressed by “exactly one planet is bright”; he thinks there are two
such planets. Similarly, for the sententialist: Plato would not have assented to
the Attic translation of “Exactly one planet is bright”.
Fregeans and sententialists have claimed to have an easy answer to this
problem. They say that the true reading of this sentence does not have the
syntax it appears to have; the sentence is to be regimented as “There is exactly
one planet which Plato believed was bright”. Call this the simple movement
strategy : according to it, the determiner phrase “exactly one planet” is assumed
to move, taking scope above the attitude verb “believe”. The simple movement
strategy allows Fregeans and sententialists to reduce any problem with 2 to the
more familiar problem of quantifying in.
But a class of well-known “third readings” and “scope paradoxes” show that
this strategy is not flexible enough. Consider:
Context (Based on Fodor [1970]) Ann, Bill, Carol and Dan are running in four
different races. John believes two of them lost their respective races, but
he doesn’t know which of the two lost. As a matter of fact, Ann, Bill,
Carol and Dan all won.
3. John believes two winners lost.
This sentence is intuitively true. But John does not stand in the belief-relation to
the structured Fregean thought expressed by “two winners lost”, nor would John
assent to (a translation of) the sentence “two winners lost”. Moreover, unlike
in the case of 2, the simple movement strategy does not produce the correct
transparent reading here, either. For in our scenario “there are two winners who
John believes lost” is false: there is no particular winner that he believes lost
(never mind two of them); he merely believes that two of these four people lost.
Fregeans and sententialists have yet to provide a systematic account of these
data, which also preserves the distinctive advantages of the theories.3 And, as
one regarding the scope of the quantifier relative to the attitude verb (“specific” vs. “unspe-
cific”), and the other regarding what we might call the “attitudinal status” of the determiner
phrase, i.e. whether it is understood as part of the content of the ascribee’s attitude (trans-
parent vs. opaque). Arguably, then, there are two kinds of transparent readings: ones in which
the quantifier is read wide-scope with respect to the attitude verb, and ones in which it is read
narrow-scope with respect to the verb. In this paper, I will set aside questions about whether
this first kind of reading exists independently of the second, and will focus on treating trans-
parent readings of the second kind. Since the traditional terminology of de dicto and de re is
typically associated with the claim that transparent readings must be produced by a scope
ambiguity, a claim which will be rejected by some theories I consider here, I prefer what I
hope is the less historically laden “transparent” and “opaque”.
3Zimmermann [2018] develops an account of these phenomena, which is sensitive to some
Fregean assumptions, but which I believe does not account for Frege’s puzzle (as in the contrast
between 9 and 10 below) or Mates’s puzzle (as in the contrast between 11 and 12 below).
Yalcin [2015, n. 48] suggests a direction for such an account, which I develop in more detail
in appendix B.
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I will discuss in detail in section 3, there are reasons for thinking that their
only hopes for doing so rest on postulating an ad hoc and unprecedented form
of syntactic movement. In the second half of the paper, however, I will argue
that such a conclusion would be incorrect. I will develop a Fregean version
of the most popular approach to scope-paradoxical readings in possible-worlds
semantics – the “Standard Solution” (as von Fintel and Heim [2002, p. 102-
9] call it; cf. Percus [2000]) – which does not require a problematic form of
syntactic movement. I conclude by discussing a new – and, it seems to me,
distinctive and important – payoff of Fregean and sententialist accounts of third
readings. Recently, a good deal of attention has been focused on data related
to counterfactual attitudes which, in possible-worlds semantics, can only be
accommodated by mechanisms which go beyond those used to account for third
readings (Ninan [2008], Yanovich [2011], Maier [2015], Blumberg [2018]). Unlike
these standard accounts, however, my Fregean account accommodates some
of the core data straightforwardly, handling them in exactly the way that it
handles third readings. This new account thus holds some promise for unifying
two phenomena which, from the vantage of possible-worlds semantics, seem to
require different treatments.
One word of caution, before we begin in earnest: I have described myself
to this point, and will continue to describe myself throughout, as developing a
“Fregean” theory. But my goal is not to offer an interpretation of the historical
Frege, and indeed I will say almost nothing about the details of Frege’s writings.
My theory will respect Frege’s claim that expressions are associated with two
dimensions of meaning, a referent and a sense, as well as his claim that proposi-
tional attitudes are relations to structured thoughts composed of non-concrete
senses. In calling my theory “Fregean”, I mean only that it makes good on these
two Fregean ideas. In fact, as I will discuss later on, there are some ways in
which my theory diverges from Frege’s own views about the semantics of atti-
tude reports. If this divergence from Frege’s views makes the label “Fregean”
seem a misnomer, I am happy to give it up. My goal is to present a theory which
captures some key attractions of Frege’s, and which has intrinsic interest of its
own in the current theoretical landscape. It is not important for the achievement
of these main aims to determine whether the proposal can or cannot be justly
called “Fregean”.
Section 2 presents my Fregean approach to the problem of quantifying in,
and describes some applications and advantages of it (section 2.5). Section 3
provides my Fregean account of third readings, and describes a new application
of it (section 3.3). Section 4 concludes. Two appendices provide further material:
Appendix A shows how to extend the basic Fregean proposal to account for
an array of further data; Appendix B provides formal implementations of two
alternative Fregean accounts of third readings.
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2 A Fregean Semantics
In this section I present a Fregean semantics of attitude ascriptions which han-
dles quantifying in. The treatment builds on ideas from Bigelow [1978]. But
presenting these ideas in a way which conforms to the style of semantic theory
developed in Heim and Kratzer [1998] requires some new ideas.
I will develop this proposal against a background Fregean metaphysics, using
notation and model theory that builds on Yalcin [2015] (who is in turn building
on Stanley [2011], in turn building on a vast array of other Frege-inspired treat-
ments). In describing my model theory I will often use distinctively Fregean
terms like “sense” and “sense-composition”. But I will remain largely neutral
on the nature of senses and sense-composition; in particular everything I say
will be consistent with taking the sense of non-variable expressions to be the
expressions themselves, and taking sense-composition to be concatenation of
expressions. So while I will use this Fregean idiom, everything I say will be
consistent with a sententialist reinterpretation of my model theory. Often in
what follows, however, I will skip over detailed discussion of issues related to
sententialism, leaving it to the reader to provide the necessary reinterpretation.
2.1 Simple sentences
I will build up my Fregean semantics in stages, by working a series of increasingly
complex examples. I start with the following simple one:
4. Hesperus is bright.
The semantics will assign a pair as the semantic value of every expression:
for an elementary expression, the first coordinate of this pair will be its ordinary
referent, and the second coordinate of the pair will be its customary sense.4 I’ll
use expressions in smallcaps to name the customary sense of elementary expres-
sions printed in that font. For instance, “hesperus” is a name of the customary
sense of “Hesperus”. As presaged above, this notation is consistent with taking
the sense of an expression to be the expression itself, but it is also consistent
with understanding with senses in many other ways. Using v for the planet
Venus, f for the ordinary referent of “is bright” (a function which takes entities
like planets as arguments), and J·K as usual as a function which maps expres-
sions to their semantic values, we would have: JHesperusK = 〈v,hesperus〉, and
Jis brightK = 〈f,is bright〉. (For now we don’t need assignment functions; I’ll
come back to those later on.)
In working with these pairs, it will be convenient to have a way of talking
about one coordinate at a time. I’ll use π1 and π2 for projection operations, so
that π1(〈v, hesperus〉) = v and π2(〈v, hesperus〉) =hesperus.
4Sometimes Fregeans invoke a hierarchy of senses to handle iterated attitude reports. I will
set aside the question of whether they need such a hierarchy here. It’s fairly straightforward
(if a bit involved) to modify my setup to allow for a hierarchy if one wanted one, but it won’t
be needed to deal with the main examples I discuss.
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Frege held that sense determines reference. I’ll formalize this idea using a
partial function ∆, that maps senses which do have referents to their referents.5
I’ll assume for simplicity that the senses of all elementary expressions do have
referents, and that for any such elementary expression α, π1(JαK) = ∆(π2(JαK)):
the customary sense of an elementary expression denotes the ordinary referent
of that expression. The system I develop in the remainder of this section is
consistent with ∆ being defined also on complex expressions in a natural way.
In particular, it is consistent with there there being a ∆ defined on π2(JαK)
for every well-formed term of the fragment α, and such that if ∆ is defined on
π2(JαK) then π1(JαK) = ∆(π2(JαK)).6
In the textbook semantics of Heim and Kratzer [1998] the semantic values
of predicates like “is bright” are functions, which have the semantic values of
names like “Hesperus” in their domain. The semantic value of the complex
expression “Hesperus is bright” is computed by applying the function denoted
by “is bright” to the denotation of “Hesperus”. But in our setting, this form
of straightforward composition by function application is not available: the pair
〈f,is bright〉 is not itself a function (even though f is) and even if we could look
past this point, the pair 〈h,hesperus〉 is not in the domain of the function f
(even though h is). But there is a natural way around this difficulty. We modify
the “Function Application” composition rule to require that we compute the
first coordinate of the semantic value of 4 by applying the first coordinate of
the semantic value of “is bright” to the first coordinate of the semantic value of
“Hesperus”, to deliver the result that π1(JHesperus is brightKg,h) = f(v). This
idea can be stated formally as follows:
Function Application (to be revised) If α is a branching node with daugh-
ters β, γ, then if π1(JγK) is in the domain of π1(JβK) then π1(JαK) =
π1(JβK)(π1(JγK)).
This rule governs the computation of the first coordinate of the semantic
value of 4. But we also need a rule for calculating its second coordinate. To
do this, we assume a dedicated operation of composing senses. Just as I will
aim to be neutral on the nature of senses, I will also aim to be neutral on the
nature of this operation, which I will notate “⊕”. In particular, as presaged
earlier, everything I say will be consistent with treating this sense-composition
operation as the concatenation operation on expressions.7 Using this notation,
5The symbol “∆” was used in a related way by Church [1946, 1951, 1973, 1974, 1993],
though I use the symbol for a function on senses, where he used it for a functional relation
between senses and their referents. Following Klement [2002, n. 18] I sometimes pronounce
the symbol by saying that senses “present” the corresponding referents, though I also often
speak (less exactly) of their “having” referents (if they have them). Note that ∆ is a function
in my (set-theoretic) model theory; I will not consider how to give semantics for fragments of
English which are extended to include expressions corresponding to ∆.
6In section 3 my semantics will no longer be consistent with such a ∆ being defined on
every well-formed term, but it will still be consistent with there being such a ∆ for every
well-formed sentence. I discuss this point in more detail in n. 30.
7The question of how to understand sense-composition among Fregeans is intimately con-
nected to the controversial question of how to understand the senses of concepts (i.e. proper-
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our goal is to write a composition rule that produces is bright⊕hesperus as
the second coordinate of the semantic value of 4. In taking this to be the goal,
I’m assuming that the order of the words in this sentence is not important for
the structure of the relevant complex sense, but that the order of application
of semantic values is. But nothing will turn crucially on this assumption; it is
just made here for the sake of concreteness. The following rule gives us the right
results for our sentence:
Sense Composition (to be revised) If α is a branching node with β and γ
as daughters, then for any g and h: if π1(JγK) is in the domain of π1(JβK),
then π2(JαKg,h) = π2(JβKg,h)⊕ π2(JγKg,h).
Together with Function Application, this rule delivers the desired result that
JHesperus is brightK = 〈f(v),is bright⊕hesperus〉.
The word “compositional” is sometimes used to mean “functionally composi-
tional”, where a system is functionally compositional, very roughly, if and only if
the semantic values of complex expressions of complex expressions are produced
by function-applying the semantic values of simpler expressions to one another.
When I say that my goal is to provide Fregeans with a compositional treatment
of quantifying in, I will not be using “compositional” in this restrictive way. My
goal is to give Fregeans a systematic theory which meets a standard informally
employed in most modern semantics papers, and is paradigmatically embodied
by the textbook of Heim and Kratzer [1998], but which does not amount to re-
quiring functional compositionality. Both of my rules above are not functionally
compositional, but they are clearly sufficiently systematic to count as “compo-
sitional” in this informal and vague sense. Those who hold that the conceptual
motivations for compositional semantic theories require only that an adequate
semantic theory be systematic in this vaguer way should thus find the theory
here satisfactory on its own. By contrast, those who hold that the conceptual
motivations for compositional semantic theories require that an adequate se-
mantic theory must in particular be functionally compositional will see this
paper as taking only a first step toward a fully satisfactory theory. Whichever
way one understands my theory, it will turn out to be challenging enough to
develop a theory which is compositional in the informal sense, and I will content
myself with meeting this challenge in this paper.8
ties). What I say below will be consistent with a variety of views. To mention just a few salient
ones, it will be consistent with taking senses which present concepts to be sense-functions (as
e.g. Church [1946, 1951] does), with taking senses which present concepts to be objects (as
e.g. Dummett [1981, p. 293-4] does), or with taking senses which present concepts to be
distinctively incomplete senses (as, e.g. Klement [2002, p. 65-76] does).
8 In fact, modifying the theory to this point to make it functionally compositional is not
formally particularly hard, but it raises conceptual questions about Fregeanism which are
orthogonal to my main concerns here.
My rule of Sense Composition does not live up to a strong form of functional compositional-
ity as it stands because it specifies a nonfunctional rule for combining the second coordinates
of expressions. We can fix this issue (if it is one), by modifying the system so that, instead
of taking the second coordinate of expressions like “is bright” to be the sense of “is bright”,
we take it to be that function which takes every sense of an expression which denotes an
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I’ve notated the property being bright as f and the first coordinate of the
denotation of the sentence as f(v). But it will be useful in what follows to
have a concrete story about what these entities are. Frege himself thought that
the ordinary referents (i.e. first coordinates) of predicates like “is bright” were
extensions (i.e. functions from entities to truth-values, which I’ll notate “1”
and “0”) and that the ordinary referents of sentences were truth values. In the
present setting we could impose this assumption, too. But in what follows I’ll
take a slightly different tack; I’ll assume that the ordinary referents of predicates
like “is bright” are (what I’ll call) intensional properties: functions from indi-
viduals to functions from worlds to truth-values. Accordingly, I’ll assume that
the ordinary referents of sentences are (what I’ll call) intensional propositions:
functions from worlds to truth-values. While this choice (and the details of my
implementation of it) will of course determine some of the development below,
I do not believe it is essential to the proposal I will present in this section (the
choice will matter more to my proposal in section 3.2). To go further into the
details we just need to make some choice here.9
individual, m, to the result of sense-composing it with the sense of “is bright”. (Pickel [2017]
develops a version of this strategy in a different context, and also provides interesting dis-
cussion of methodological issues surrounding functional compositionality.) This modification
raises important questions about whether Fregeans should understand the relevant aspect of
the meanings of predicates to be senses or merely related to senses, and if the former, whether
senses compose by function application or some other mechanism. To give a sense of the array
of positions here: Dummett [1981, p. 293-4] suggests that senses of concepts are not themselves
functions but that occurrences of predicates in indirect have as their referents functions on
senses, not senses (so that we’d take our second-coordinates to be such functions); Church
[1946, 1951] understands the senses of concepts to be functions, so that they can compose
by function-application directly, requiring no change to what is written in the main texts;
Klement [2002, pp. 66-76] holds that senses of concepts are a distinctive kind of incomplete
sense, requiring a special form of (non-functional) composition.
My rule of Function Application does not live up to a strong form of functional composition-
ality because it applies first-coordinates to first-coordinates, not semantic values to semantic
values. We can fix this issue (if it is one) by taking the semantic values of expressions like
“is bright” to be functions on the whole semantic values of their arguments, which yield the
appropriate pair as their values. Such predicates could still have senses, but their senses would
be compositionally inert. To preserve the basic structure of the present system, this second
modification should go along with the assumption that quantifiers always operate on predi-
cates produced by movement of a trace (otherwise, it would yield something like the system
in Lederman [2021], and require the kind of modification discussed in section 4 of that paper).
9One motivation for making this choice is to abstract from issues about alethic modalities
which are orthogonal to the questions which concern me here. Neo-Fregeans face a choice
about how to handle alethic modalities like “necessarily”: either they will say that such ex-
pressions are like attitude verbs in that they operate on thoughts composed of senses, and that
expressions which occur in their scope change what they refer to; or they will say that these
expressions are like “is bright” in that they operate not on senses but on something computed
from the ordinary referents of the expressions contained in their complement clauses. If I had
made the former choice, I would have owed the reader some account of these alethic modals
in this paper; by contrast the implementation I’ve opted for lets me straightforwardly adopt
the usual possible-worlds treatment of those modalities. Of course some Fregeans and senten-
tialists may be driven to their position by resistance to appeal to possible worlds, so that for
them this choice will look bizarre. I’ll come back to this issue at the end of section 3.2 below.
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2.2 Adding Attitude Verbs
We now turn to the treatment of simple attitude reports, which I will introduce
using the following example:
5. Plato believed Hesperus was bright.
The previous section described how to compute the semantic value of the pre-
jacent of “believe” in this sentence; the goal of this section will be to add a
lexical entry for “believe” and extend our composition rules to accommodate its
composition with this prejacent.
Fregeans hold that there is an important relation between people and struc-
tured thoughts which underwrites the semantics for attitude verbs; in the case
of “believe” I’ll write this relation as “BEL”. I will assume that for a person x
and thought p xBELp is an intensional proposition, a function from worlds to
truth-values. The simplest proposal for the ordinary referent of “believe” is:
Believe π1(JbelieveK) = λp : p ∈ Dmp .λx : x ∈ De.xBELp.
This entry requires some comment on the model theory I will be assuming in
the background throughout the paper. I’ll use e for the syntactic type of a name
or pronoun referring to an individual, and p, for the syntactic type of a sentence,
with e → p the syntactic type of an adjective or verb-phrase, and so on from
there. (I’ll use “p” (mnemonically, “propositions”) as opposed to “t”, since the
latter is often used for truth-values and this could cause some confusion.) I will
assume that for every syntactic type σ, there are two domains – Dσ and Dmσ
– the first corresponding to the ordinary referents of standard expressions of
this syntactic type, and the second corresponding to their customary senses. I’ll
assume that Dσ and Dmσ are disjoint, and also that if σ 6= τ then Dσ is disjoint
from both Dτ and Dmτ .
10 Looking back at our entries in the previous section,
we can say now that the first coordinate of the semantic value of “Hesperus” is
an element of De (an individual), and the second coordinate to be an element
of Dme .
11
10In making this assumption, I am suspending an important commitment of Frege’s own,
namely, that senses are individuals, i.e. elements of De. This Fregean commitment is also very
natural for sententialists: for them, the second coordinates of expressions’ semantic values are
expressions, and hence individuals, i.e. elements of De. I won’t make this Fregean assumption
here because, while I don’t have a proof that it would be inconsistent given the assumptions
I have made explicitly, reasonable ways of extending my assumptions would be subject to a
version of the Appendix B paradox of Russell [1903]. (See Klement [2001] and Klement [2002,
Ch. 5-7], for extensive discussion of versions of this inconsistency in a variety of Fregean
systems.) I will thus use the system with type-distinctions among senses, since I am more
optimistic it can be extended in a natural, consistent way, and in any case it is still rich
enough to allows me to engage with the main questions I want to address. If a natural system
where structured senses are elements of De were shown to be consistent, one could transform
my system into a version of that one by simply taking De to contain my Dmσ for all σ.
11To guarantee that expressions of higher syntactic types receive lexical entries which allow
them to compose in the right way, I’ll make two further assumptions: first, for any types σ and
τ , Dσ→τ is the set of functions from Dσ to Dτ ; second, if x ∈ Dmσ→τ and y ∈ Dmσ , then
x⊕y ∈ Dmτ . The first of these assumptions ensures that typical first-coordinates can compose
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The entry above says that the first coordinate of the semantic value of “be-
lieve” takes senses of sentences, i.e. second coordinates of their semantic values,
elements of Dmp , as its arguments. The result is then a function which takes an
individual as an argument and produces an intensional proposition as its value,
i.e. a function which returns true at a world if and only if the relevant individual
is related by BEL at that world to the relevant structured thought.12
Our goal is for the first coordinate of the semantic value of 5 to be the
intensional proposition which is true at worlds where Plato is related by BEL to
the Fregean thought hesperus⊕is bright. Our lexical entry paves the way for
this result, but our initial rule for Function Application is not sufficiently flexible
to get us there. That initial rule only allows us to calculate the first coordinates
of semantic values of complex expressions by applying the first coordinates of
simpler expressions to the first coordinates of other simpler expressions. It would
thus make the first coordinate of the semantic value of 5 undefined: the first
coordinate of the semantic value of “believe” cannot compose with the first
coordinate of the semantic value of “Hesperus is bright”, since the latter is an
intensional proposition (not a structured Fregean thought), and is not in the
domain of the former. To resolve this problem, we modify the rule for Function
Application as follows:
Function Application If α is a branching node with daughters β, γ:
(a) if π1(JγK) is in the domain of π1(JβK) then π1(JαK) = π1(JβK)(π1(JγK));
(b) if π2(JγK) is in the domain of π1(JβK) then π1(JαK) = π1(JβK)(π2(JγK)).
The first clause, (a), simply repeats the initial rule for function application;
when it is possible, we want to apply the first coordinate of the semantic values
of an expression to the first coordinate of its argument. But now the rule is more
flexible: (b) tells us that when it is possible we apply the first coordinate of the
semantic value of an expression to the second coordinate of its argument. In the
case of 5, the first coordinate of the semantic value of “Hesperus is bright” will be
an element of Dp, and so not in the domain of λp : p ∈ Dmp .λx : x ∈ De.xBELp.
But the sense of the sentence (the second coordinate of its semantic value) will
be an element of Dmp and thus in the domain of the relevant relation. Our
second clause (b) allows the first coordinate of the semantic value of “believe”
to find this argument, producing our desired result for the first coordinate of
by functional application to produce an entity in the right domain, and the second similarly
ensures that when senses compose they produce a sense in the right domain. For instance, it
guarantees that is bright⊕hesperus is an element of Dmp , the sense of a sentence, which I’ll
also call a “thought”.
12The semantic value of “believe” does not correspond straightforwardly to the pattern we
saw above for “Hesperus” or “is bright”, where an expression of syntactic type σ receives
a lexical entry in Dσ × Dmσ . The syntactic type of “believe” is p → (e → p), but its first
coordinate is not an element of Dp→(e→p); it is instead an element of Dmp→(e→p). I assume
that Fregeans will want to articulate a general principle linking syntactic type to semantic
type, which allows this case while also ruling out more outlandish ones. But I won’t take a
stand on how to state such a general principle here.
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the semantic value of the sentence as a whole.13
This extension of Function Application also requires an extension of our ear-
lier rule of Sense Composition. The basic idea of Sense Composition was for the
second coordinate of the semantic value of a complex expression to result from
sense-composing any constituents which were applied by Function Application
in producing the first coordinate. Our earlier rule for Sense Composition did this
in the simple case where the first coordinate of the semantic value of a complex
expression was produced by applying the first coordinate of the semantic value
of one of its constituents to the first coordinate of the semantic value of another.
But it is now possible that first coordinates of the semantic values of complex
expressions can be computed by applying the first coordinate of the semantic
value of a constituent expression to the second coordinate of a constituent ex-
pression, and we need to extend our rule for Sense Composition to handle this
case as well:
Sense Composition (still to be revised) If α is a branching node with β
and γ as daughters, and if π1(JγK) or π2(JγK) is in the domain of π1(JβK),
then π2(JαK) = π2(JβK)⊕ π2(JγK).
These rules now produce the desired result that
JPlato believed Hesperus is brightK =
〈Plato BEL (is bright⊕hesperus), (believe⊕(is bright⊕hesperus))⊕plato〉.
This basic theory handles simple attitude reports neatly. The theory does
not, however, formally mark Frege’s idea that what an expression refers to (and
expresses) changes depending on whether it is embedded under an attitude verb:
regardless of the context in which it occurs, the first coordinate of the semantic
value of an elementary expression will always be its ordinary referent, and the
second coordinate will always be its customary sense. Since the theory does
not mark what an occurrence of an expression refers to (as distinct from the
ordinary referent of the expression), it also does not allow us to make sense of
Frege’s requirement that what an occurrence of a complex expression refers to
is determined by what the occurrences of its constituent expressions refer to.
In a note, I discuss how my theory might be brought more into line with these
views of Frege’s own.14 But I do not view the question of whether it can be as
13In the system of this paper, it will turn out that (a) and (b) are never in conflict. Partly,
this is due to my stipulation that the domains of senses are always distinct from the domains
of referents. For instance, if senses were taken to be elements of De, then “John runs” would
fall under the ambit of both parts of the rule: (a) would produce the reasonable reading; while
(b) would produce an unreasonable one on which john (the sense/expression) is said to run.
This problem could however be avoided by adding an extra condition to the beginning of (b),
which states that it comes into effect only if (a) cannot be used. This change would require
corresponding changes to Sense Composition (below) and other rules of the system, but those
changes are straightforward and I won’t discuss them further.
14We can mark what expressions refer to as follows. If an occurrence of an expression is
not embedded under any attitude verb or similar operator, we say that it refers to the first
coordinate of its semantic value. Otherwise, we say that it refers to the second coordinate of
its semantic value. (I am setting aside issues to do with a hierarchy of senses here (see n. 4),
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central to my project. As I have said, my goal is to develop a useable theory
inspired by Frege, not to vindicate every aspect of Frege’s own view. My theory
is compositional at the level of semantic values, as is standardly required in the
modern setting. And it is Fregean in the sense I advertised at the outset, since
it makes good on two important ideas of Frege’s own: that meanings have two
dimensions – reference and sense; and that propositional attitudes are relations
between people and structured thoughts composed of senses.
Instead of seeing the fact that the theory does not mark a change in what
expressions refer to as a limitation, I prefer to see the theory as offering a new
perspective on the motivations for the doctrine of reference-shift. This doctrine
is motivated by the desire to have different occurrences of a single expression
contribute different aspects of the meaning of the expression to the meaning
of complex expressions. Typically, this idea is implemented by requiring that
different occurrences of an expression can in an important sense have different
semantic values, or even meanings. But my theory shows that there is a differ-
ent way forward. We can accommodate the idea that different occurrences of a
single expression contribute differently to the meaning of complex expressions
without altering their semantic values, provided we utilize a sufficiently flexi-
ble composition rule. Such a composition rule can allow us to call on different
aspects of an expression’s meaning as needed, without changing the semantic
values of occurrences of the expressions. The present system does just this: we do
not alter what occurrences of expressions refer to or express, but instead allow
different occurrences of a single expression to compose with other expressions
in different ways.
2.3 Quantifying in
With these pieces of the theory in place, we turn at last to the problem of
quantifying in, exemplified by 1, which I repeat here for ease of reference:
1. There is a planet which Plato believed was bright.
In giving a treatment of this sentence, I assume that the quantifier “there is”
has a syntactic type which takes two expressions of predicate-type and produces
a sentence, i.e., that the sentence can be regimented as: (∃ (planet)) (7 Plato
believed t7 was bright). Here the 7 indicates that there is to be Predicate Ab-
straction or λ-abstraction, which binds variables indexed by 7 within its scope.
but it’s not hard to incorporate a hierarchy if one wants to.) If we mark what expressions refer
to in this way, then what occurrences of complex expressions refer to will be compositionally
determined by what their constituent occurrences of simpler expressions refer to. These moves
bring us a significant step closer to Frege himself. But they do not get us all the way there: what
complex expressions refer to will not be determined via functional composition alone from
what simple expressions refer to. Most obviously, what occurrences of expressions embedded
under attitude verbs refer to will compose with one another by sense-composition, not by
function application. But it is not clear that this is an idiosyncratic feature of my treatment,
since there are in principle reasons for thinking that this goal can’t be achieved while preserving
other important views of Frege’s. See Pickel [forthcoming] for helpful discussion and citations.
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On this regimentation of the syntax of our sentence, the key question is how to
handle this Predicate Abstraction.
Central to my treatment of Predicate Abstraction will be a special treatment
of variables. I will assume that there are two assignment functions supplied by
context, g and h. The first of these, g, is an ordinary assignment function which
maps indices to elements of De. The second, h, maps individuals to senses, i.e.
elements of Dme . Russell [1905] famously said that there is no “backward road”
from reference to sense. But in this setting, in context, h will precisely provide
such a backward road, choosing one distinguished sense for each referent. Given
this backward road in context, we interpret free pronouns by the rule:
Traces JtiKg,h = 〈g(i), h(g(i))〉
and use the following rule for abstraction:
Predicate Abstraction If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ,
where β dominates only a numerical index i of type e, then for any as-
signment functions g and h,
(a) π1(JαKg,h) = λx : x ∈ De.π1(JγKg[x/i],h).
(b) π2(JαKg,h) = lambda-i⊕ π2(JγKg,h[i/g(i)]))
Here and throughout, I will use g[x/i] for the function such that g[x/i](i) = x
and g[x/i](j) = g(j) for all j 6= i in the domain of g. This applies not only for the
case where a function has indices as its domain, as g does, but also for functions
like h, which have other domains. In clause (b), for example, h[i/g(i)] is the
function such that h[i/g(i)](g(i)) = i but for all y 6= g(i) h[i/g(i)](y) = h(y).
This rule allows us to compute the semantic value of “which Plato believed
was bright”, and, crucially, allows the first coordinate of that semantic value
to be a function on individuals, as I will now show. By Predicate Abstraction,
we have that: π1(J7 Plato believed t7 was brightKg,h) = λx : x ∈ De.π1(JPlato
believed t7 was brightKg[x/7],h). Since BEL isn’t defined on first arguments of
semantic values, computing this semantic value requires that we use clause (b)
of Function Application; the expression can be simplified to: λx : x ∈ De.
Plato BEL (π2(Jt7 was brightKg[x/7],h)). To see the mechanics of this expres-
sion consider first the semantic value of the trace t7 relative to the assign-
ment functions g[x/7], h. Since in general JtiKg,h = 〈g(i), h(g(i))〉, here we have
Jt7Kg[x/7],h = 〈g[x/7](7), h(g[x/7](7))〉 = 〈x, h(x)〉; the pronoun is assigned an
individual by the shifted first assignment function, and also a sense of that indi-
vidual by the (unshifted) second assignment function. Crucially, the variable is
assigned a sense as its second-coordinate even though the function denoted by
the λ-term is a function on individuals, not on senses. The clause for variables
thus allows abstraction to produce a property of objects like planets (elements
of De) because it only shifts the first assignment function, while nevertheless
allowing us to compute the semantic value of the whole clause, because the
second assignment function assigns the trace an appropriate sense. This is the
trick that solves the problem of quantifying in; from here it’s easy to see that
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things will work out. The whole λ-term computes to: λx : x ∈ De. Plato BEL
(h(x)⊕ was ⊕ bright). And thus if the value of h(v) is either hesperus or
phosphorus, the sentence will come out true. There will be an object, namely
Venus, which is a planet, and whose value under h, is a sense m such that Plato
is belief-related to the result of composing m with the sense of “is bright”.15
Following Bigelow [1978], the key move here is to assume, in context, a back-
ward road from reference to sense, or, in the sententialist’s idiom, a distinguished
expression for each individual. The idea that objects which are relevant to a con-
versation are associated with a salient way of thinking about them seems quite
plausible. The formal object h generalizes from these plausible central cases
to a function from all objects to senses of them. The assumption that context
supplies such a function does not seem problematically more demanding than
the absolutely standard assumption that context supplies a normal assignment
function, g, which maps numbers to objects. Natural views about what it is for
context to provide such a g generalize straightforwardly to stories about what
it is for context to provide such an h.
The second coordinate of an abstraction – represented by clause (b) here –
is a little more abstruse than the first coordinate, but it is conceptually quite
important. First, we need a way of computing appropriate senses for binding
that occurs within the scope of an attitude verb, for instance on the most salient
reading of “Plato believed that some of the gods did not love their children”.
On this reading, the fact that “their” is bound by an abstraction below “some
of the gods god” must be reflected in the sense of the complement clause of
“believed” so that the whole sentence says that Plato was belief-related to the
thought that some of the gods did not love their own children. The mechanism
for preserving this binding structure must also work when there are multiple
embeddings in a sentence, and when abstraction binds across an attitude verb,
as in “John learned that there is a planet which Plato believed was bright.”
In fact, this second coordinate is important even in unembedded uses of 1. For
Fregeans will naturally hold that the asserted content of an assertion is what
the participants in a conversation come to believe if they accept that assertion,
and since they hold that structured Fregean thoughts are the objects of belief,
they will hold that such unembedded assertions have as their asserted content
the second coordinate of their semantic value, which must therefore reflect the
binding structure of the sentence as well.
15Heim and Kratzer’s rule for Predicate Abstraction is not compositional (see e.g. Rabern
[2012], Yli-Vakkuri [2013]), and my rule inherits this feature of it. As I said earlier, my goal
is to meet the standard of Heim and Kratzer on behalf of the Fregean, not to exceed it. To
go beyond Heim and Kratzer here, my style of Fregean could use standard ways of producing
a (functionally) compositional theory, for instance, by taking expressions’ semantic values in
general to be functions on assignment functions (e.g. Janssen and Partee [1997], with discussion
in Pickel [2017, §7]). But it is unclear whether the resulting theory will really be Fregean, for
reasons somewhat related to those mentioned in n. 8, concerning whether Fregeans can allow
the relevant dimension of expressions’ meaning to be (for example) functions from assignment
functions to senses rather than senses themselves. As with the earlier issues, I will leave these
hard questions to others, and will be content here to produce a theory that lives up to the
informal standard of compositionality alluded to earlier, and embodied by Heim and Kratzer
themselves.
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The way in which our clause for the second coordinate achieves these results
requires a few further assumptions, but is formally straightforward. We assume
that for every, and every variable-index i of type e, there is a sense lambda-i
of type mp→(e→p); this means that sense-composing this sense with one of type
mp yields a sense of type me→p.
16 We also assume that corresponding to each
such sense, there is a special sense of type me, i, understood to mark the place
where the binder would bind. Given these assumptions, clause (b) ensures that
the second coordinate of sentences which include an abstraction will display the
binding structure by the coordination of the same numeral in a sense of a λ-term
as occurs in the place where a trace would be required, for instance, a relevant
occurrence of “lambda-7” coordinated with relevant occurrences of “7”.17
Claiming that ordinary people stand in the belief-relation to thoughts con-
taining a sense notated lambda-7 might seem to require, absurdly, that every-
one understands the λ-calculus as used in semantics. But my notation should
not be understood in this way. People do think thoughts which differ in ways
corresponding to what our formal system represents as differences in binding
structure. Everyone, Fregeans included, must hope for some theory of how the
contents of such thoughts differ. My rule for the second coordinate of Predicate
16These ideas could be extended to variables of types other than e, and abstraction over
nodes of types other than p, but but we won’t need the general versions of the ideas here.
17 Our assumptions to this point leave open an odd possibility. Consider again the sentence
“Plato believed some of the gods did not love their children”. It is standard to allow for
infinitely many distinct syntactic regimentations of the intended reading of this sentence,
varying by which index is assigned to relevant traces. The syntax corresponding to “Plato
believed (some of the gods) 1 (t1 did not love t1’s children)” is distinct from that corresponding
to “Plato believed (some of the gods) 2 (t2 did not love t2’s children)”, and so on. These distinct
syntaxes should not generate semantically distinct readings: the multiplicity here is simply
a byproduct of flexibility required for sentences with multiple binders or free pronouns. But
our system to this point leaves open the possibility that the different syntaxes would lead to
semantic differences. For the first will be true if Plato was belief-related to a thought which
consists in part of the senses lambda-1 and 1, while the second will be true if Plato was
belief-related to a thought which consists in part of the senses lambda-2 and 2, and these are,
as far as we have said, different senses.
A Fregean or sententialist might respond to this thought in three different ways, the third
of which I’ll take as part of the official position of the paper. The first (in my view the
most plausible position for a sententialist) is to hold that the standard formal system for
variable binding is at fault, and must be altered. While this system is fine for most purposes,
the sententialist might argue, when we look closely at belief-reports, we see that notation
matters, and we should hope for a system which generates only syntaxes that align more
closely with the semantic facts, perhaps the wire diagrams of Quine [1940/1981] or something
else (see e.g. King [2007, Appendix] and Higginbotham [1991] for thoughts along these lines). A
second response (only available to the Fregean) is to hold that however the notation of binding
works, the thought expressed by a sentence regimented according to syntax s is identical to
the thought expressed by a sentence regimented according to syntax s′ if s′ differs from s
only by appropriate relabeling of bound variables (i.e. to any α-equivalent sentence). (Bigelow
[1978] has a nice way of producing this result systematically (see pp. 124-5 for discussion).)
A third response (available to both the sententialist and Fregean) is to hold that the BEL
relation is such that, necessarily, if a person bears it to the thought expressed by a syntax s
in context, they bear it to any thought which is expressed by a syntax s′ which differs from s
only by the appropriate relabeling of bound variables (i.e. to any α-equivalent sentence). As
I have said, I will assume in what follows that Fregeans and sententialists adopt this third
response, mainly because it can be endorsed by proponents of both positions.
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Abstraction is stated using a particular way of conceptualizing those differences
in content; it assumes that binding is represented in thought in a way that
structurally mirrors the way it is notated in formal semantics. But nothing in
my system depends on the details of this toy theory of how binding is repre-
sented in thought. Essentially any reasonable theory could be substituted here
for the toy one I have used; we can think of the rule for the second coordi-
nate schematically as saying: “deliver a thought which represents the binding
structure appropriately, while preserving other aspects of the relevant sense”.18
2.4 Situating the account
This completes my presentation of my basic proposal for a Fregean/sententialist
semantics which handles quantifying in. In this section and the next, I will
situate this account. In this section I note three contrasts between the view
developed here and the most prominent recent proposal for how Fregeans should
handle quantifying in, that of Yalcin [2015]. In the next, I offer some rough
comparisons between the present account and standard accounts of attitude
reports in possible-worlds semantics. In appendix A I further show how the
account can be extended to handle a wider array of data, and to produce truth-
conditions featuring existential quantification over senses, which many Fregeans
have aimed to produce. I do not present these details in the main text, since
they will not be relevant to the main thread of development, but I think they
are an important component of a full Fregean theory.19
A first difference between the present account and Yalcin’s concerns sen-
tences like “Someone believes they are a spy” and “Some boy’s mother believes
he is a spy”, in which a binder binds a pronoun both outside the scope of an
attitude verb and inside the scope of an attitude verb. Yalcin’s theory predicts
either that these sentences are undefined or that they are false.20 But intuitively
they can be true. The present proposal allows these true readings.
A second difference concerns the logic of numerical quantifiers. Recall that
there are eight planets. Yalcin’s proposal allows the following to be true in a
single context:
18A different concern is that, unlike “Hesperus”, “λ” is not an expression which is assigned
a denotation; it is not a term of our language at all, but a syncategorematic marker of binding
structure, and thus, lambda-1 is a sense which does not have a corresponding denotation.
This issue is subtle and requires more discussion than I can give it here. But I will note that
Frege also held that some senses (e.g. the customary sense of an empty definite description)
do not have a corresponding referent, so the mere fact that these senses have no referent is
not problematic in itself. Moreover, the limitation does not affect the prospects of assigning
denotations to complex senses which are in the domain of ∆; it is consistent for instance with
∆ mapping the second coordinate produced by Predicate Abstraction to the first. So, as I
claimed earlier, the second coordinates of well-formed expressions can still be mapped to the
first by ∆.
19The points I make in this section in comparing my account to Yalcin’s hold equally well
for the theory in appendix A.
20Whether they are false or undefined depends on whether the sense-domains in his appendix
are defined to be disjoint from the domain of individuals, and whether sense-composition is
defined on the latter.
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6. There are eight planets which Plato knows are bright, and eight planets
which Plato does not know are bright.
The present proposal, by contrast, predicts that this sentence cannot be true in
a single context. While I won’t develop an account of how Fregeans should think
about validity or entailment, the fact that the present approach predicts that the
sentence above is true in no context at all suggests that it is in a better position
to vindicate intuitive entailment relations among sentences featuring numerical
quantifiers (e.g. it vindicates the claim that in every context the inference from
“there are eight planets which Plato knows are bright” to “there are no planets
which Plato does not know are bright” preserves truth).
A third contrast concerns the de se. The present proposal, unlike Yalcin’s,
allows Fregeans to handle the de se by analogy to the de re. This last point
is perhaps particularly conceptually significant. One of Yalcin’s central targets
in his paper is the Fregean, intellectualist treatment of “know-how” ascriptions
presented by Stanley [2011] cf. Pavese [2017, Appendix C, D]. Yalcin argues
that, given Yalcin’s own semantics, Stanley’s claims that Fregeans can handle
the de se in parallel to the de re are false. But, as I show in the attached note,
the present proposal allows us to make good on Stanley’s basic idea within a
Fregean framework.21
21The formal ideas I’ll discuss here are due to Santorio [2014], but I will rehearse them in
our present Fregean context.
There is a standard contrast between:
7. Bekele wants to win.
8. Bekele wants himself to win.
(The examples are Yalcin’s.) If Bekele sees himself running a race on TV, but doesn’t recognize
himself, one can use 8 – but not 7 – truly to describe the situation. The question – one which
is central to the account of know-how in Stanley [2011] – is whether Fregeans can provide a
semantics that predicts this contrast. Following in a distinguished tradition, Stanley [2011]
hopes that if Fregeans postulate a distinguished class of senses – “first- personal senses” –
they can restrict the quantification over senses introduced in their semantics for the de re
to first-personal senses in the case of the de se. But Yalcin shows that if Fregeans adopt
Yalcin’s approach to quantifying in, this hope will be dashed. A standard syntax for 7 has a
covert pronoun PRO occurring inside the scope of the attitude verb, which is bound above
the attitude verb:
9. Bekele [ 1 t1 wants [ PRO1 to win ] ].
Yalcin [2015, Section 11] argues that, given this syntax and Yalcin’s semantics, we cannot
simply restrict the quantification over senses to “first-personal” modes of presentation of
Bekele.
But in the present system it is straightforward to impose the requirement that the quan-
tification over senses be restricted to first-personal ones for obligatorily de se pronouns. We
assume that the variable corresponding to PRO carries extra information; for instance, in
addition to having an ordinary numerical index, it also has an extra index ∗. We then alter
the Traces rule so that: JtiKg,h = 〈g(i), h(g(i))〉 and Jti,∗Kg,h = 〈g(i), h(〈g(i), ∗〉); assume that
every sense-assignment function h is defined not only on individuals, but also on pairs con-
sisting of an individual and ∗; and assume that its value on such pairs is a first-personal sense
of the relevant individual.
Given these assumptions, 7 will receive the following truth-conditions:
10. Bekele is desire-related to winning⊕m, where m is the salient first-personal sense of
Bekele.
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2.5 Logical omniscience and Mates’ puzzle
The present theory thus compares favorably to Yalcin’s. But, one might won-
der, is there linguistic motivation for being a Fregean or sententialist in the first
place? In this section I rehearse some standard reasons for favoring Fregeanism/sententialism
by comparison to the benchmark semantics of Hintikka [1962], as well as some
well-known modifications of it.
In the Hintikka semantics, pS believes ϕq is true in a context if and only
if ϕ expresses an intensional proposition in that context which is true at every
(metaphysically/logically) possible world consistent with S’s beliefs. This theory
thus renders the following two ascriptions equivalent:
7. John believes that the axioms of Peano arithmetic imply that the biggest
prime number is greater than five.
8. John believes that the axioms of Peano arithmetic imply that there are
positive integers a, b c and n > 2 such an + bn = cn.
The complement clauses of both ascriptions are true at exactly the same (meta-
physically/logically) possible worlds (i.e. at none), and hence the Hintikka se-
mantics predicts that the first is true if and only if the second is. This is a bad
prediction, since intuitively the first might be true, while the second is false.The
present theory avoids this bad prediction, since the theory is consistent with
holding that the senses of the complement clauses are distinct, and hence that
the sentences have different truth values in a single context.
As has been much discussed (e.g. Lewis [1970], Cresswell [1975], Cresswell
and Von Stechow [1982], Cresswell [1985]), one can accommodate the difference
between 7 and 8 without being a Fregean or a sententialist. One idea (put very
roughly) is to hold that the semantic values of complex expressions are syntactic
structures decorated with the semantic values of the simple expressions which
are their terminal nodes, but to hold that these semantic values are (roughly)
the standard ones the expressions would have in possible worlds semantics. (So
“Hesperus” is associated with just an individual, “is bright” with an intensional
property, and so on.) While this approach faces many technical difficulties, which
have as yet received no widely accepted resolution (see Von Stechow [1985] for
discussion of some in Cresswell’s theory), it offers the promise that one could
accommodate a difference between 7 and 8 without endorsing Fregeanism or
sententialism. Since the two complement clauses of “believe” in these sentences
Using the extension of the present proposal described in appendix A, we can go further, to
produce almost exactly the truth-conditions Stanley [2011, p. 88ff.] hoped for (although our
syntax for these sentences is a different, more usual one, than the one he postulates). In the
extended system, we require that if t is an element of f(x), then t maps first-personal senses
of x to first-personal senses of x. The truth conditions for 7 will then be:
11. Bekele is such that there is a salient first-person sense m of Bekele and a salient sense
f whose denotation is the property of winning, such that Bekele is desire-related to
f ⊕m.
The present proposal therefore provides at least partial vindication of Stanley’s ambitions for
a Fregean semantics that handles the de se straightforwardly.
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have different syntactic structures, the kind of “structured” theory I have just
described will guarantee that they have distinct semantic values, allowing for a
difference in truth-value between the two reports.
But as has also long been recognized, even if this more flexible theory can be
developed in a consistent way, it is plausibly still not flexible enough to account
for all related data. A structured theory of propositions, plus a Millian theory
of proper names – on which the semantic value of a name is determined by the
object it names – predicts that the following are equivalent:
9. Plato believed that Hesperus rises in the evening.
10. Plato believed that Phosphorus rises in the evening.
But intuitively the first could be true in circumstances where the second is
false. The problem for the structured approach just described is that these
sentences have the same syntactic structure, and also have the same semantic
values in each element of the structure (since we are assuming a Millian theory
of proper names); such a structured theory on its own is not sufficiently general
to produce the intuitive contrast. The theory I have developed in this paper,
however, produces these results straightforwardly, since the sense of “Hesperus”
is presumed to be distinct from the sense of “Phosphorus”.
One might think that the foregoing problem arises only for a particular
theory of the meaning of names. But crucially it is much more general. Mates
[1952] presented essentially the following problem as a counterexample to a very
early version of the above ideas found in Carnap [1947]:22
Context Barbara, a monoglottal English speaker, thinks that groundhogs are
blind like mole rats, while woodchucks are sighted and are often seen
above ground. In fact, woodchucks just are groundhogs. There is a wood-
chuck/groundhog who lives in Barbara’s neighborhood, who is known to
Barbara and other locals as “Alonzo”. Barbara recognizes that Alonzo is
a woodchuck, but she thinks he is not a groundhog; in fact she believes
she’s never seen a groundhog:
11. Barbara believes that Alonzo is a woodchuck.
12. Barbara believes that Alonzo is a groundhog.
Since “woodchuck” and “groundhog” have the same extension at every possible
world, the structured theory sketched above will predict that 11 and 12 are
equivalent. But intuitively they are not: 11 is acceptable in describing the story,
while 12 is not. Once again our Fregean has the resources to make the correct
prediction here, provided (as is typically assumed by Fregeans) the sense of
“woodchuck” is not the sense of “groundhog”.23
22See also Partee [1973] and Higginbotham [1991], the latter of whom directly applies this
problem to the theory of Cresswell and Von Stechow [1982].
23The intuitive contrast between 9 and 10, and between 11 and 12 sentences can be explained
by a straightforward extension of a coarse-grained theory, which assumes that attitude reports
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There are many further questions to be asked about the empirical coverage
of the account. I address some of these in Appendix A.24 But my goal here is
not to offer anything like an exhaustive treatment. This brief discussion is just
meant to give context for why one might hope that a Fregean or sententialist
theory will indeed work out in the end.
One might think that all the points I have made are moot, because the
present theory is so much more complex than standard possible-worlds based
theories, and hence not worth exploring, regardless of its other putative advan-
tages. This prejudice against Fregean theories seems to me based on an impor-
tant mistake. The basic Hintikka semantics covers none of the data discussed in
this subsection, and it is not fair to compare a theory which can accommodate
these data to one which cannot. Moreover, if we compare the present theory
to a genuine competitor, which has similar empirical coverage, it is not at all
clear that the present one is more complex. For instance, theories which build
on Percus and Sauerland [2003] (see Anand [2006], Charlow and Sharvit [2014])
to give an account of 9 and 10 must modify standard syntax to include vari-
ables over concept-generators and must postulate that the relation expressed by
“believe” is multigrade (or else that the verb is ambiguous between countably
infinite relations). And in fact, as they stand these theories still do not account
for data closely related to 9 and 10 (see n. 23 and Lederman [2021]). Alterna-
tively, theories like Ninan [2012] or Rieppel [2017] (which can account for these
further data) make attitude verbs operate on assignment functions in a way that
is at least as unfamiliar as the distinctive second coordinates used here. Most
importantly, neither of these groups of theories on their own have their resources
to accommodate the contrast between 11 and 12. Recent extensions to handle
such further data all involve a great deal of extra machinery and complexity,
which makes them look at least as complex as the present theory (Baron [2015],
Tancredi and Sharvit [2020], Soria Ruiz [forthcoming]).
are context sensitive, and that the sentences are naturally interpreted in different contexts (for
discussion see Schiffer [1979], Crimmins and Perry [1989], Dorr [2014]; see now Goodman and
Lederman [forthcoming]). But natural versions of this contextualist approach cannot explain
a similar contrast for slightly more complex sentences, e.g. the contrast between:
(i) Plato believed that Hesperus shares its orbit with Phosphorus; and
(ii) Plato believed that Hesperus shares its orbit with Hesperus.
See Goodman and Lederman [forthcoming, §9] and Lederman [2021, §2] for discussion. So,
while going versions of this kind of contextualism can do significantly better than non-
contextualist theories in accommodating some relevant data, they still do not accommodate
all the data the Fregean can handle.
24Some I do not address there, but which I believe the account handles straightforwardly, are
the subtle data discussed in Tancredi and Sharvit [2020] and now Soria Ruiz [forthcoming].
A more challenging set of data that has been much discussed are the de qualitate reports
of Schwager [2009]. It would take me too far afield to discuss these here, but suffice it to
say that I think the reports she discusses are either examples of Mates’s puzzle (as in her
“buyers’ intentions” and “Burj Dubai” cases), or should be handled by a mechanism analogous
to that discussed in Abreu Zavaleta [2019] and Blumberg and Lederman [2020] (“Foyle’s
investigation”). For a similar take on the first class of cases, see Kusliy and Vostrikova [2019].
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3 A Fregean account of third readings
3.1 The problem
I now turn to the second problem of the paper. To recall, the goal is to provide
a Fregean account of “third readings” and “scope paradoxes” (Fodor [1970],
Bäuerle [1983]). These readings can be illustrated by the following scenario,
repeated from the introduction:
Context (Based on Fodor [1970]) Ann, Bill, Carol and Dan are running in four
different races. John believes two of them lost their respective races, but
he doesn’t know which of the two lost. As a matter of fact, Ann, Bill,
Carol and Dan all won.
3 John believes two winners lost.
This sentence has a true reading. But the true reading cannot be the usual
opaque one: John does not stand in the belief-relation to the structured Fregean
thought expressed by “two winners lost”. And it also cannot be the reading
produced by interpreting “two winners” outside the scope of “believes” in line
with the simple movement strategy; in this scenario “there are two winners who
John believes lost” is false. There is no particular winner that John believes
lost; he merely believes that two of these four people lost.
How might Fregeans account for this datum? It is natural to start by con-
sidering existing accounts in possible worlds semantics, to see whether Fregeans
can adapt them to their purposes. In possible worlds semantics, two different
kinds of approach have received most attention.25 A first approach – which I
will call “the sophisticated movement approach” – postulates a new form of
movement. On a simple version of this approach, for instance, it is postulated
that a predicate (in our case “winners”) moves outside the scope of the rele-
vant attitude verb (“believes”) and, as a result is interpreted in differently. In 3,
the relevant interpretation could be paraphrased very roughly as “the winners
are such that John believes two of them lost”, which is intuitively the correct
reading.26
There are some challenges in the details, but it is fairly straightforward to
develop a Fregean version of this approach, as was suggested already by Yalcin
[2015, n. 48]. I present such an account in appendix B. Although doing so is not
technically difficult, it is significant that it can be done. If Fregeanism had no
account of third-readings, this would be a powerful reason to reject the theory.
But there would still be reason to be dissatisfied if this were all that Fregeans
could achieve. While the sophisticated movement approach can deliver the cor-
rect truth-conditions for third readings, it remains controversial whether it is
25von Fintel and Heim [2002, Ch. 8] and Keshet and Schwarz [2019, §5] both provide excel-
lent surveys, along with summaries of considerations for and against different ways of handling
these data.
26Different forms of movement can produce the same result, for example, if the quantifier
moves but leaves a trace of a different type (usually (e→ p)→ p). I discuss this second kind
of movement in more detail in appendix B.
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consistent with the laws of syntax. I will not rehearse these considerations here,
since they have been well-discussed in other places (see von Fintel and Heim
[2002, Ch. 8.4], Keshet and Schwarz [2019, §5.4]). But doubts about the plau-
sibility of the syntactic movement postulated by versions of this approach have
been an important factor leading many semanticists to reject it, and to prefer
instead a different approach to third readings, which does not require syntactic
movement of the problematic kind. Indeed, this second approach has become
the benchmark approach to third readings, so much so that in their textbook
von Fintel and Heim [2002, p. 102-9] call it the “Standard Solution”. Given this
situation, if Fregeanism and sententialism could only offer a movement-based
account of the scope paradoxes, these theories would be “hostage to fortune”.
They would depend on controversial views about syntactic movement, and hence
depend on how delicate issues in syntax are resolved. By contrast, since stan-
dard possible worlds theories can invoke the Standard Solution, such theories
do not depend on how these syntactic questions are settled.
At first sight, this problem for Fregeanism and sententialism might seem to
be inescapable.27 A guiding idea behind both theories is that lexical material in
the complement clause of an attitude verb should receive a distinctive semantic
treatment, indicative of the fact that it contributes to the content of the reported
attitude. As a result, whether an expression is interpreted as contributing to the
content of a reported attitude or not – what we might call the attitudinal status
of the expression – is determined by its scope with respect to relevant attitude
verbs. This tight connection between syntactic facts about relative scope and
semantic facts about attitudinal status seems baked in to Fregeanism and sen-
tentialism. And thus it might seem that syntactic movement, which changes the
relative scope of key expressions, is the only hope these theories can have for
producing third readings.
The prospects for Fregeans and sententialists to develop a non-movement
based account of third readings initially seem bleak. And when we look at the
details of the Standard Solution – the leading non-movement-based account in
possible-worlds semantics – the prospects for such an account seem, if anything,
even bleaker. On the Standard Solution, it is postulated that world- or situation-
pronouns appear in the syntax of English, and different patterns of binding for
these pronouns are used to explain the contrast between opaque and transparent
readings, by shifting whether the relevant lexical material is interpreted at the
worlds of an ascribee’s attitudes, or at different worlds (Percus [2000]). It is
hard to see how Fregeans or sententialists could imitate these results. Neither
Fregeans nor sententialists have a notion of “belief-world”, so it is unclear how
they could use world-pronouns to shift what I earlier called the “attitudinal
status” of any lexical material.
But in the rest of this section I will show that, in spite of these prima facie
challenges, Fregeans and sententialists can develop a version of the Standard So-
lution, and thus that neither of these views is “hostage to fortune” with regard
to questions about the plausibility of particular forms of syntactic movement.
27For the following points, see Yalcin [2015, p. 240-241]
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The Fregean account of third readings that I will present will be somewhat in-
tricate. In my view, the intricacies are illuminating: they shed light on subtle
conceptual issues for Fregeans, as well as on the mechanics of the Standard So-
lution itself. But some may be satisfied with knowing that Fregeans can provide
a non-movement-based theory of third readings, without needing to understand
in detail how exactly this is done. Those readers may skip to section 3.3.
3.2 Detailed implementation
On the most familiar versions of the Standard Solution, every expression of
the language takes a world-pronoun as its argument (Percus [2000]). I will start
from a slightly different approach, on which only special expressions have world-
pronouns as arguments.28 The main reason for this choice is to simplify the
technical presentation. Everything I’ll do below could have been done starting
from a more standard version of the Standard Solution; it just would have been
more complex.








I will build up to my interpretation of the whole sentence starting from the
key expression “RIG t4w winners”.
Let’s begin with t4w . Following the Standard Solution, I will assume that
there are world-pronouns which occur in the syntax of natural language, and
which belong to a new syntactic type s. I will assume moreover that these world-
pronouns are associated with special indices of the form nw for natural numbers
n and that the functions g and h are extended to assign worlds (elements of
a new Ds) and senses of worlds (elements of a new Dms) to these indices as
before, i.e. for JtnwKg,h = 〈g(nw), h(g(nw))〉. Let’s bracket for the moment any
worries about whether Fregeans should accept that there are such pronouns, or
28I take inspiration here from Schwarz [2012], and some of my technical development is
indebted to his. But Schwarz’s goals are much more ambitious than mine; he wants to use
a restriction on which expressions take world-pronouns to predict the distribution of these
pronouns and rule out unwanted readings. My approach won’t achieve those more ambitious
aims; it will allow some unobserved readings, and (like the more standard Standard Solution)
must rely on further assumptions about syntax to rule them out. I’ll return to this point later
on.
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that there are senses of worlds at all. I’ll return to these questions at the end of
the section.
Next we have a new expression, “RIG”, for “rigidifier”. The lexical entry for
the rigidifier is as follows:
RIG
(a) π1(JRIGKg,h,κ) = λw.λF.λx.λw′.F (x)(w)
(b) π2(JRIGKg,h,κ) = κ
The first coordinate of the semantic value of the rigidifier is a function which
takes a world w and an intensional property F to a rigid intensional property
which, for any individual, returns true at a world w′ if and only if the individual
is in the extension of F at the specified world w. I’ll discuss the second coordinate
of the semantic value in detail in a moment. For now, I simply want to note
that the second coordinate is determined by context as follows. The denotation
function will from now on be understood to be relativized to a new parameter,
“κ”, in addition to the two assignment functions, and the second coordinate of
the semantic value of the rigidifier is whatever the value of this parameter is, in
the given context.
We can begin to illustrate the mechanics of the rigidifier by computing the
first coordinate of the complement clause of 3 in the syntax above. Since the first
coordinate of t4w relative to an assignment function g will as usual be g(4w),
the first coordinate of the semantic value of JRIG t4w winnersKg,h,κ will be:
λx.λw′. x is a winner at (g(4w)). Using a standard entry for “two”, the whole
complement clause will then compute to: λw′. there are two winners at g(4w)
who lost at w′. If g(4w) is the actual world, this can be paraphrased as “two
people, who in fact won, lost”. This first coordinate is exactly what the Standard
Solution would predict in a possible-worlds setting as the whole semantic value
of the complement clause. We could have achieved this result in a simpler way
(for example, as on the Standard Solution itself), but the extra complexity we
have introduced here will be needed to produce the correct second-coordinate
for the complement clause, which, for the Fregean, is where the real action is.
To motivate my approach to this second coordinate, let us first consider why
a flatfooted extension of our earlier system will not work here. The flatfooted
extension of our account so far would be to sense-compose the senses of “two”,
“RIG”, “t4w”, “winners” and “lost”, and assume that the resulting thought
denotes the intensional proposition just described. This approach will not work
because Fregeans will naturally say that in this situation, John does not stand
in the belief-relation to any relevant thought which has the sense of “winner” as
a constituent. John certainly does not stand in the belief-relation to a thought
that he would express as “two people who are in fact winners lost”. And more
generally, since John does not think that the relevant people are winners, it is
unclear how there could be any relevant thought which both has the sense of
“winner” as a constituent, and is believed by John.
I will go beyond the flatfooted treatment by introducing a way of replacing
the sense of “winner” with a sense which is a constituent of a relevant thought
25
that John stands in the belief-relation to. In particular, I will assume that the
second-coordinate of the semantic value of “RIG” is not itself a sense but instead
a function from senses to senses. To make way for this possibility, I will first
extend the earlier rule for Sense Composition, so that it allows for second-
coordinates which are functions:
Sense Composition If α is a branching node with β and γ as daughters, then
for any g:
(a) if π2(JγKg,h,κ) is in the domain of π2(JβKg,h,κ), then π2(JαKg,h,κ) =
π2(JβKg,h,κ)(JγKg,h,κ);
(b) if not, then if π1(JγKg,h,κ) or π2(JγKg,h,κ) is in the domain of π1(JβKg,h,κ),
then π2(JαKg,h,κ) = π2(JβKg,h,κ)⊕ π2(JγKg,h,κ),
The new addition here, in clause (a), says that if it is possible (and here this
will only arise in connection to κ, the second coordinate of the semantic value
of “RIG”) we apply one second coordinate to another. Clause (b) tells us that
if (a) is not applicable, we use the original clause for Sense Composition.
This brings us at last to the second coordinate of the semantic value of
“RIG”, and our new parameter κ. As promised, I will assume that the κ supplied
by context for 3 above is a function which takes the sense of a world to a function
which replaces the sense of “winner” with a sense of the rigid property which
is true of an individual at a world if and only if they are winners at the world
g(4w). More formally, recalling that ∆ maps senses to their referents, we say
that a function k : Dms → (Dme→p → Dme→p) is a sense-rigidifier if and only
if ∆((k(mw))(mF )) = λx.λw
′.∆(mF )(x)∆(mw), that is, if and only if k takes
a sense of a world w and a sense of an intensional property F , and returns a
sense of the rigid intensional property given by the extension of F at w. Since
there may be many senses of a given intensional property, there are many sense
rigidifiers. We assume that every context supplies one of them.
With these assumptions in place, we can compute the second coordinate of
the semantic value of the clause below the world-abstractor in the syntax for 3
presented above. We apply κ to the second coordinate of Jt4wKg,h,f,κ and apply
the resulting function to winners, yielding a sense f , which (regardless of the
value of κ in context) is guaranteed to be a sense of the rigid property which
returns the set of winners at the world g(4w). We then have π2(Jtwo RIG t4w
winners lostKg,h,κ) =two⊕f⊕lost. If g(4w) is the actual world, and κ in our
context returns (when applied to the salient sense of the actual world mw, and
to winners), a sense corresponding to the list “Ann, Bill, Carol and Dan”, then
the sentence will plausibly be true. John does think precisely that two of Ann,
Bill, Carol and Dan lost. At least in the case where g(t4w) is the actual world,
our treatment promises to deliver the correct result for the clause below the
world-abstraction.
This is a big step in the right direction, but we are not quite done. We have
not yet said how to handle the crucial abstraction over worlds at the head of
the sentence, and in fact this abstraction will turn out to pose a more difficult
challenge than any we have dealt with so far.
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Before discussing how this abstraction is challenging for Fregeans, let us first
step back to consider why it is needed in the first place. In 3 we can plausibly
produce a correct interpretation of the sentence by considering only the value
of “winners” at the actual world – i.e. the set consisting of Ann, Bill, Carol and
Dan. But it easy to see that this simple way of handling such sentences does
not work in general: in slightly more complex examples we must have a way of
varying which set of people is chosen. For instance:
Context John believes two of Emma, Frank and Grace lost. His beliefs are
true, but they were formed in an unreliable way; if Emma, Frank and
Grace had all won, as could easily have happened, John still would have
thought they lost. So:
13. It could have been that John thought two winners lost.
The correct reading of this sentence cannot be produced if the only available
interpretations are (a) an opaque reading on which John must think to himself
“two winners lost” or (b) a transparent reading on which the predicate “winners”
is interpreted with its extension in the actual world. For in the relevant scenario,
we are not considering a possibility where John changes his beliefs; rather we
are considering the possibility that Emma, Frank and Grace all won, and in that
case (where John had the same beliefs he actually has), John would have thought
that two winners lost. The example motivates allowing the modal “it could have
been that” to vary the world relative to which the extension of “winner” is fixed.
Abstracting over worlds gives us a way of doing just this: if the world-pronoun
occurring inside the attitude report is bound by an abstractor over worlds which
occurs inside the scope of “it could have been that”, then given that the first
coordinate of the semantic value of this modal operates on the first coordinate
of its prejacent, we can produce the appropriate intensional proposition as the
first-coordinate of the whole sentence.
So we need this abstraction over worlds. But it might seem that my Fregean
can handle it straightforwardly, by extending the clause for abstraction over
individuals presented in section 2.3 to the case of worlds. This is half right. The
first coordinate of the abstraction can indeed be handled in this way: just as in
the case of individuals, we use g to shift the value of a world-pronoun and h
to ensure that the relevant sense is a sense of the shifted world. But it is only
half right, because the second coordinate of the abstraction poses a new and
distinctive challenge. As discussed earlier, Fregeans will naturally hold that the
asserted content of a sentence in context is something which hearers believe,
and thus that it is a thought; in our setting it will be the second coordinate
of the semantic value of the sentence. Fregeans typically hope that the second
coordinate of a sentence in general will reflects the syntactic structure of the
sentence; in our case, that the relevant thought reflects the fact that it was
the result of a third reading. But this desideratum presents us with a serious
challenge. A moment ago we revised the rule of Sense Composition to allow
function application in the computation of second coordinates. These revisions
were needed precisely because we wanted the sense of “winners” to be replaced
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with something more appropriate in the thought which John is said to be belief-
related to. The revisions were designed so that when the contextually supplied
κ applies to the sense of a world-pronoun, and when the result is applied to
the sense of a predicate, the sense of the predicate in question (“winners”)
disappears, as do the functions which are used to make it disappear. But this
tactic delivers the wrong result for 3 as a whole; using the κ above it would
yield:
lambda-w-1⊕(believes⊕(two⊕Ann, Bill, Carol and Dan⊕lost))⊕John
Here, the world-pronoun has been lost, and there is no evidence that the
reading is the result of a third-reading. This is bad enough. But the same strat-
egy applied to 13 yields even worse results. It would predict that the relevant
sense would not preserve the structure of binding between the abstraction over
worlds and the world-pronoun beneath the modal “it could have been that”,
since it would predict that the sense of the world-pronoun disappears is not
present at all in the thought expressed by the whole sentence.
This problem might seem inevitable. It might seem impossible to both (i)
use function application in computing the second coordinate of the prejacent
in 3 (to replace the sense of “winner” with something more suitable), and, at
the same time, (ii) ensure that the sense of the whole sentence preserves the
fact that it resulted from a transparent reading. But, as I will now show, in fact
Fregeans and sententialists can manage to have their cake and eat it too. The
key is in the second coordinate of a new rule for World Abstraction:
World Abstraction If α is a branching node with daughters β and γ, where
β dominates only a numerical index iw, then for any assignment functions
g and h, and any κ,
(a) π1(JαKg,hκ) = λw.(π1(JγKg[w/iw],h,κ)(w)).
(b) π2(JαKg,h,κ) = lambda-w-i⊕ π2(JγKg,h[w-i/g(iw)],h(κ)).
(Here we assume world-abstraction only occurs over nodes of type p and we
assume that for every i lambda-w-i is a sense of type mp→p. We also assume
that h is extended to provide senses to entities which are the type of κ.)
The final application to w in clause (a) is a technical condition which fixes a
type-mismatch that would otherwise arise. This results from the special version
of the Standard Solution I am using, not from any aspect of Fregeanism, so I
discuss it only in a note.29 The key conceptual idea is in clause (b). As one
29The mismatch would arise because, for the relevant γ, π1(JγKg[w/iw ],h,κ) is an intensional
proposition, so that λw.(π1(JγKg[w/iw ],h,κ)) (which one might have expected in clause (a)) is
not an intensional proposition, but instead a function from worlds to intensional propositions.
To produce an intensional proposition, then, we apply the intensional proposition that would
be the value of this latter function at a world w, to w itself, thereby producing a function from
worlds to truth-values, as desired. (For more details, see Schwarz [2012, p. 446].) If we had
assumed that every expression has a world-pronoun as its argument, and altered the types of
the first coordinates of expressions accordingly, this complication would not have been needed
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would have expected from the parallel clause in Predicate Abstraction, World
Abstraction abstraction alters the sense of the relevant world-pronoun to w-i:
this sets the stage to allow the binding structure to be preserved in the sense of
the whole sentence. But crucially it also alters the value of κ to a sense h(κ).
Since h(κ) is a sense and not a function on senses, it no longer triggers clause
(b) of Sense Composition, but instead composes with other constituents via
clause (a). So this sense of κ will be preserved in the structure of the sense of
the sentence, even though it disappears from the thought which the sentence
says John is belief-related to.
The system as a whole thus allows us to do two things which might have
seemed incompatible. First, when we compute the second coordinate of the pre-
jacent of “believes” in 3, κ disappears, and also replaces the sense of “winners”
with something more suitable. This allows the first coordinate of the semantic
value of the whole sentence to be an appropriate intensional proposition, which
can be true in our scenario, even though John does not stand in the belief-
relation to a relevant thought which has the sense of “winners” as a constituent.
But, second, at the same time, the second coordinate of the semantic value of
the whole sentence re-instates a sense of κ, and also has the sense of “winners”
as a constituent, recording the fact that the first coordinate is the result of a
transparent reading.30
In concluding this discussion, I want to highlight three features of the pro-
posal. First, the system allows us to interpret not only (i) the usual opaque
reading of 3 (with no world-pronouns) and (ii) the transparent reading of this
sentence (with a world-pronoun bound by a binder taking scope outside of
“believes” in the sentence), but also (iii) a reading where “RIG t1w” occurs
above “lost” instead of above “winners”, yielding a bizarre interpretation para-
phrasable as “John believes two winners are the actual losers”; and (iv) an
alternative syntax on which the world-pronoun is bound inside “believes”, as
follows:
(though, as I said earlier, dealing with these worlds would have created a number of other
needless distractions).
30In the system of this section ∆ is not defined on the second coordinate of semantic values
of all well-formed terms. In fact ∆ is not even defined on the second coordinates of some
elementary expressions, since ∆ is not defined on relevant κ, the second coordinate of the
semantic value of the elementary expression RIG. (κ is a function from senses to senses, but
is not itself a sense, while ∆ is defined only on senses.) ∆ is also not defined on the result of
applying κ to the sense of a world, since we have assumed that the results of these applications
are functions on senses, not senses. Even so, at least in the case studied here, it is consistent to
require that when ∆ is defined for the second coordinate of the semantic value of an expression
∆(π2(JαKg,h,κ)) = π1(JαKg,h,κ).
Note also that the system can be characterized as compositional (though not functionally
compositional) in terms of what expressions refer to (if we label what expressions refer to in
the way described for the system of section 2 in n. 14). Or, at least, it can be characterized










The basic Standard Solution in possible-worlds semantics also predicts a
reading analogous to (iii), and there has been much discussion of how it might
be ruled out (Percus [2000], Keshet [2008], Schwarz [2012]). This problem is
not a special problem for the Fregean, and the Fregean can adopt some of the
existing strategies to handle it. But the problem with (iv) is distinctive for the
Fregean. In standard possible-worlds semantics, this reading would be seman-
tically equivalent to the opaque reading. But in our Fregean setting it will not
be: it will require that John stands in the belief-relation to a possibly distinct
thought which has the sense kappa, and the sense of a world, as constituents.
What should Fregeans say about this alternative reading? There are a variety
of options. The simplest way to avoid this issue would be to stipulate that the
world-pronoun must be bound outside at least one intensional operator in whose
scope it occurs. This kind of stipulation is not dramatically different from vari-
ous principles which have been proposed as constraints on where world-pronouns
can be bound, and so perhaps not objectionably ad hoc, insofar as the Fregean
of this section is simply aiming to achieve parity with the Standard Solution
(Percus [2000], Keshet [2008]). Alternatively, Fregeans might hold that while
not unavailable, the interpretation corresponding to the syntax above is out-
competed by the much more plausible interpretation which does not involve the
locally bound world-pronoun. Alternatively still, Fregeans might try to develop
a not-fully-structured conception of senses, holding that the sense of “λ1w two
t1w RIG winners lost” is identical with the sense of “two winners lost”. This last
option might seem initially most attractive, but much more work would need to
be done to see whether it is consistent in general.
Second, the proposal requires that, when a person’s beliefs can truly be
reported using a transparent attitude ascription, the person must stand in the
belief-relation to a thought composed in part of a sense of a rigid property. For
instance, I assumed that John stood in the belief-relation to a thought composed
in part of the sense of the list “Ann, Bill, Carol and Dan”. This assumption was
natural in our setting. But one might wonder whether in every case where
such reports are available, the ascribee can be reasonably said to stand in the
belief-relation to a relevant thought. In response to this concern, I note that a
parallel assumption is also built into all competing treatments I am aware of.
In the possible-worlds setting we cannot speak of “constituents” of the content
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of individuals’ beliefs, since there is not a clear notion of a “constituent” of an
intensional proposition. But we can still speak of an expression’s semantic value
relative to an assignment, and on the possible worlds version of the Standard
Solution, in transparent attitude reports the restrictor of a determiner will in
effect be assessed as a rigid property. The same point holds for possible-worlds
versions of the sophisticated movement approaches, as well as for the Fregean
versions of them I develop in in appendix B.
Third, whereas my assumption that intensional propositions are the first
coordinate of the semantic values of sentences could be seen as simply a choice
for the sake of concreteness in the context of section 2, the theory of this section
depends more heavily on this assumption. In fact, the approach of this section
does not just depend on the use of intensional properties and propositions, it also
appeals to world-pronouns – which refer to worlds – and even senses of worlds.
Both of these facts may give pause to Fregeans and sententialists, who may reject
the idea that intensional propositions are any aspect of the meaning of sentences,
and may even reject the very idea of intensional propositions. In response to
these concerns, I want to observe, first, that my use of world-pronouns is less
extensive than it might seem at first sight, and, second, that the way they are
used seems to correspond to a general demand that any adequate theory must
have a way of meeting. For the first point, the system does not predict that any
senses of worlds are constituents of thoughts attributed by attitude ascriptions,
or in fact even of thoughts expressed by whole sentences. When we compute
the second-coordinate of the complement clause of 3 on its intended reading, κ
makes the sense of the world disappear, so that the thought to which John is
said to be belief-related does not itself have the sense of a world as a constituent.
And the second coordinate of the semantic value of the whole sentence also does
not contain the sense of a world; it contains only a special bound-world sense,
which indicates that the sense of the rigidifier is to be interpreted along with the
binder that occurs at the head of the sentence. These observations about how
exactly world-pronouns are used pave the way for my second point: that the
use of world-pronouns to record binding structure corresponds to a very general
demand that everyone must have an account of. Everyone needs some way of
explaining how a modal can shift the reading of distant embedded material in
third readings of sentences like 13. The approach I’ve presented here articulates
these shifts in terms of the comparatively well-understood machinery of world-
pronouns, but if Fregeans have an alternative way of accounting for such shifts,
then since my account only uses world-pronouns to capture these shifts, they
should be able to “plug it in” here as well.
The proposal of this section gives Fregeans a non-movement-based account
of transparent readings of determiners embedded in intensional operators. I
have not argued that this approach is the best available Fregean approach. In
fact, if the syntactic movement postulated by the strategies which I develop in
Fregean terms in Appendix B is acceptable, then I believe that Fregeans should
adopt some version of those comparatively simpler accounts. Here, I have simply
shown that, even if those accounts are ruled out on syntactic grounds, this fact
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alone would not doom Fregeanism or sententialism. Contrary to appearances,
these theories too are compatible with a non-movement based account of third
readings.
3.3 A puzzle about counterfactual attitudes
In closing this discussion I want to shift gears a little, to consider an empirical
payoff of a Fregean/sententialist approach to third readings.
Consider the following case due to Blumberg [2018] (cf. Ninan [2008], Yanovich
[2011], Maier [2015]):
Context It’s Saturday morning, and Bill wakes up to find that the window
of the back-door of his house has been smashed, with a trail of muddy
footprints leading to his study. Fearing the worst, he runs to his study to
check on his safe. He discovers the safe door open, and the safe emptied of
its contents. His valuable collection of silverware is nowhere to be found.
Given all of the evidence, Bill is quite certain that he’s been burgled, and
that the perpetrator acted alone. As it happens, Bill wasn’t robbed. His
wife removed the silverware from the safe so that it could be cleaned; a
confused bird flew into the window pane and smashed it; and the muddy
footprints belonged to Bill – he made them unknowingly the night before.
After calling the police, Bill sits at his kitchen table with his head in his
hands and says ‘I wish that the person who robbed me had never robbed
anyone’.
14. Bill wishes that the person who robbed him had never robbed anyone.
This sentence has a true reading in this scenario. But as Blumberg notes, this
true reading cannot involve an opaque reading of “the person who robbed him”:
Bill does not wish that there is a robber who does not rob. In our Fregean
idiom, Bill does not stand in the wish-relation to the Fregean thought expressed
by ordinary uses of “the person who robbed Bill never robbed anyone”.
Blumberg also argues that the reading cannot arise from a transparent read-
ing. On this transparent reading, the determiner phrase “the person who robbed
him” would be evaluated at the world of evaluation of the whole sentence, i.e.
from the speaker’s perspective. Since the speaker knows that no one robbed Bill,
the intensional proposition expressed by “the person who (actually) robbed him
had never robbed anyone” would be the proposition which is true at no worlds at
all. Since Bill’s wish is again not the trivial one that an arbitrary contradiction
be true, this transparent reading would not be appropriate, either.
This argument against the appropriate reading of the sentence being a trans-
parent one relies essentially on the possible-worlds framework. The argument
shows that the intensional proposition expressed by the complement of “wish”
on the transparent reading is the proposition which is true at no worlds. If
“wish” is given a lexical entry which operates on such intensional propositions,
then it is hard to see how the sentence would have a reasonable true reading. But
in our Fregean setting “wish” will not operate on intensional propositions; it will
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operate on Fregean thoughts (or, in the sententialist’s idiom, on sentences). And
there are many Fregean thoughts (and sentences) which determine the trivially
false intensional proposition. We saw this already in connection to 7 and 8: in
those two sentences the complement clause of the relevant attitude reports both
expressed the trivially false intensional proposition. But the senses associated
with the complement clauses (and the complement clauses themselves) were dif-
ferent, so that the Fregean and sententialist could straightforwardly account for
differences in the truth or falsity of the relevant sentences.
Merely making this observation – that the Fregean setting opens the possi-
bility for a true transparent reading of 14 – is of course not enough to count as
a “solution”. One needs to say at least what the Fregean thought / expression
is that Bill stands in the wish-relation to. But our theory of third-readings pro-
vides an answer to this question.31 On a transparent reading of the determiner
phrase with respect to the attitude verb “wish”, the relevant Fregean thought
will be composed of the sense of “the”, a sense of the rigidification of the prop-
erty expressed by “person who robbed Bill”, and the sense of “never robbed
anyone”. Provided the salient sense of the relevant rigid property is something
like “person who in fact robbed Bill”, Bill’s wish will not be contradictory: he
will wish, precisely, that the person who in fact robbed him never robbed any-
one. There is nothing contradictory in wishing that a person who in fact did
something had done something different. If Bill had been robbed, he would have
wished exactly this. Of course, because Bill was not robbed there is no person
who in fact robbed him, and the intensional proposition corresponding to this
Fregean thought will be the trivially false one. But that does not make his wish
trivial, since his wish is a relation to a Fregean thought, not to an intensional
proposition.
The Fregean and the sententialist thus have a natural and intuitive account
of the object of Bill’s wish in this case. Fregeans and sententialists do owe us
a fuller theory of how κ is determined by features of context so that it delivers
the intuitively natural object of Bill’s wish. This question is an urgent one
for Fregeans and sententialists. But it is a question that arises for the theory
independently of its approach to the data of this section, since it arises for the
treatment of third readings in the previous section as well. This observation
underscores a key point: whereas standard possible-worlds based theories (as
the cited authors have argued) cannot handle 14 using machinery already in
place to handle 3, Fregeans and sententialists can. Unlike the possible-worlds
based theories, then, Fregeanism and sententialism have some hope of giving a
unified treatment of third readings and the general class of examples like 14. If
they are able offer such a unified treatment in general, this would seem to give
them a theoretical advantage over their competitor theories.
At present, this advantage is merely a hope for Fregeans and sententialists.
It may be that Fregeans and sententialists cannot handle all data which are
prima facie similar to 14 by the mechanism I have just described. But the fact
31This answer does not depend on the specific implementation of the previous subsection,
as opposed to the treatments presented in appendix B, but it does depend on the details of
Fregeanism specifically.
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that, as I have shown, the tools developed for third readings deliver this result
even for 14 itself is interesting, and I hope it will spur further investigation of
Fregean and sententialist treatments of this kind.
4 Conclusion
In the first half of this paper, I developed a new Fregean/sententialist semantics
for attitude reports. My semantics builds on an idea from Bigelow [1978], but
presenting this thought in the format of Heim and Kratzer [1998] requires some
new ideas. The resulting account improves in several ways on the prominent
recent Fregean treatment of Yalcin [2015], perhaps most notably by allowing
the Fregean to treat the de se in parallel with the de re, as had been suggested
by Stanley [2011]. Appendix A shows how the account can also be extended to
an array of further challenging data.
The second half of the paper considered how Fregeans might give an account
of the “third readings” discovered by Fodor [1970]. It is fairly clear that they
can give an account of such data using sophisticated theories of movement (such
accounts are developed in detail in appendix B). But if these approaches were
the only ones available to Fregeans, Fregeanism would depend on controversial
claims about syntactic movement, and the theory would thus be “hostage to for-
tune” in an arguably problematic way. In section 3.2, I showed that Fregeanism
is not hostage to fortune in this way, by developing a Fregean version of the
“Standard Solution” from possible worlds semantics. This theory not only brings
Fregeanism and sententialism up to date as competitors to more standard the-
ories, but also has immediate payoffs. Whereas possible-worlds-based accounts
must treat certain data about counterfactual attitudes using machinery that
goes beyond what is required to handle third readings, Fregeanism offers some
hope for handling these two apparently disparate classes of reports by the same
mechanism.
Fregean and sententialist approaches to the semantics of attitude reports
have largely fallen out of the mainstream in formal semantics in recent years. But
these alternatives to the mainstream possible-worlds semantics offer a distinctive
perspective on data which have proven difficult to accommodate within more
mainstream theories. With more systematic investigation, they may offer us not
just a fresh perspective, but empirically more adequate and theoretically more
satisfying account of an array of hard data.
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Appendix A Extending the basic system
In this section I present an extension of the basic theory from section 2.
I will motivate this extension by a series of examples, starting from the
“Paderewski” example of Kripke [1979] (cf. Schiffer [1979] on “Thelma”). In
Kripke’s example, Peter knows that Paderewski is a pianist, and that Paderewski
is prime minister of Poland, but thinks that Paderewski the pianist is not a
politician. Kripke observes that the following can both be used truly to describe
Peter:
15. Peter believes that Paderewski is prime minister;
16. Peter does not believe that Paderewski is a prime minister.
The basic theory of section 2 cannot account in a natural way for the fact
that both of these sentences have true readings. One way to extend the theory
to do this would be to say that the name “Paderewski” is context-sensitive
and associated with different senses in different contexts, or that the name
“Paderewski” as used to refer to this particular Paderewski is ambiguous, and
that different disambiguations are associated with different senses.32 Here I will
pursue a different approach, on which the verb “believe” is context-sensitive and
can (in effect) express different relations on different occasions of use.
To achieve this result, we slightly alter the lexical entry for the verb “believe”,
in a manner inspired by Carnap [1947], Davidson [1968], Kaplan [1989, §XX] and
Richard [1990] among many others. The word “believe” will now denote not the
32Since sententialists take the second coordinate of expressions to be the expressions them-
selves, they can’t say that names are associated with different expressions in different contexts,
if they are the very same name. So a sententialist version of this approach would be to say
that there are two different names “Paderewski” (see, e.g. Fiengo and May [2006]).
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BEL relation itself, but rather the relation which holds between a person and a
thought m when the person stands in the BEL relation to some thought which is
relevantly related to m. Formally, a transformation t is a function from Dmp to
Dmp such that ∆(t(m)) = ∆(m), that is, a function which maps every thought
to a thought which determines the same intensional proposition. We assume
that context supplies a function f from individuals to sets of transformations
which are salient relative to those individuals:
Extended Believe π1(JbelieveKg,h,f ) = λp.λx. for some t such that t ∈ f(x)
x BEL t(p).
(We omit κ here, since the present extension is thought of as directly extending
the account of section 2.)
This extension of the basic system allows us to give a straightforward account
of the fact that both 15 and 16 have true readings. The first will be true in
contexts where some transformation which is salient relative to Peter maps
the thought expressed by “Paderewski is a prime minister” to one that Peter
is belief-related to, and the second will be true in contexts where all of the
salient transformations for Peter map this thought to one that Peter is not
belief-related to. This result depends crucially on the fact that the lexical entry
introduces existential quantification only over only over the transformations
which are salient in context, and that which transformations are salient can
differ in different contexts.33
This flexibility raises some questions about the predictiveness of the ap-
proach. I’ll discuss these questions at the end of this appendix. But before I do
that, I want to consider how our new lexical entry handles three other kinds
of examples which pose problems for the basic account presented in the main
text. The first is from Quine [1956] and has come to be known as an example
of “double vision”. Here is a version of Quine’s case:
Context Ralph sees Ortcutt by the docks. Ralph concludes on the basis of
what he sees that Ortcutt is a spy, Later, Ralph watches Ortcutt’s mayoral
inauguration address on TV. Ralph thinks that no mayor could possibly
be a spy; the background checks are simply too rigorous. So he concludes
that Ortcutt the mayor is not a spy.
17. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
33In the main text, I have presented the formalism on the assumption that h will change
from context to context. But the use of transformations opens up a different possibility. A
Fregean could hold instead that for each individual, there is a distinguished “de re” sense,
and that context always supplies this sense as the sense of the relevant variable, so that h
would not change from context to context. There are various ways one could spell out this
view further, by adding hypotheses about the metaphysics of mind. For instance, one might
hold that people who stand in the belief-relation to particular thoughts featuring particular
“acquaintance-based” senses, automatically stand in the belief-relation to relevant thoughts
composed of the de re sense. (For discussion of related ideas, with citations, see Yalcin [2015,
§7].) On a natural version of this view, if the sense of “Venus” is an “acquaintance-based”
sense, anyone who stands in the belief-relation to the thought expressed by “Venus is bright”
thereby automatically stands in the belief-relation to the thought composed of the de re sense
of Venus and the sense of “is bright”.
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18. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
On the natural assumption that in this case for any sentence such that Ralph is
belief-related to the thought expressed by that sentence, he is not belief-related
to the thought expressed by the negation of the sentence, the Fregean theory
from section 2 cannot predict that these two sentences are true in the same
context. And this might seem to be a problem, since it might seem that these
two sentences can be true in the same context.34
Extended Believe allows us to give a true reading of these two sentences in
a single context, while upholding the assumption that for any sentence such
that Ralph is belief-related to the thought expressed by that sentence, he is
not belief-related to the thought expressed by the negation of the sentence.
The sentences can be true in a context where a transformation which maps
the thought expressed by “Ortcutt is a spy” to something like that expressed
by “The actual person Ralph saw by the docks is a spy” is salient relative to
Ralph, and in addition a transformation which maps the thought expressed by
“Ortcutt is not a spy” to something like that expressed by “The actual mayor of
Ralph’s town is not a spy” (which may or may not be the same transformation)
is also salient relative to Ralph.
The second kind of example, from Stephen Schiffer, gives rise to what is
sometimes called the “Madonna problem”:
Consider
19. Everyone who has ever known her has believed that Madonna
was musical.
According to the Fregean proposal, there is a particular mode of
presentationm of Madonna and a particular mode of presentationm′
of the property of being musical such that the foregoing utterance of
19 is true only if everyone who has ever known Madonna has believed
the proposition 〈m,m′〉. Yet this is surely too strong a requirement
on the truth of 19. It requires that everyone who has ever known
Madonna shared a single way of thinking of her and a single way of
thinking of the property of being musical, and this is most unlikely
given that there may have been people who knew her as a child and
then died and that someone like Helen Keller may have been among
them.” (Schiffer [1992, p. 507-8], numbering of the example altered
to fit the present paper)
If cognitively diverse people cannot stand in the belief-relation to the thought
expressed by “Madonna is musical”, then the Fregean theory of section 2 cannot
predict the true reading of this sentence.
34One might argue that they are not true in the same context, for instance by suggesting
they are “revisionist reports” Blumberg and Lederman [2020]. I discuss this style of response
and more refined arguments against it in detail in Lederman [2021, §5.1 and 7.1].
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But Extended Believe allows us to handle this report, while preserving the as-
sumption that very cognitively diverse people cannot stand in the belief-relation
to the thought expressed by “Madonna is musical”. We simply assume that the
various transformations made salient by the story above map the thought ex-
pressed by “Madonna is musical” to a wide array of different Fregean thoughts.
If each relevant person stands in the belief-relation to one of these thoughts,
Extended Believe can allow that the the sentence is true.
A third kind of example was to my knowledge originally developed by Soames
[1989-90, p. 198f.] (cf. Higginbotham [1991, p. 362 ex. 42] and, more extensively,
Soames [1994]), but has recently been brought back into the spotlight by Sharvit
[2010] and Charlow and Sharvit [2014]:
Context John knows that Jupiter is bigger than Mars, and that Mars orbits
the sun faster than Jupiter. He believes no planet is bigger than Jupiter,
and no two planets are exactly the same size. He thinks that Hesperus is
Jupiter and thinks that Phosphorus is Mars.
19. There’s a planet which John thinks is as big as Jupiter and orbits the sun
as fast as Mars.
Intuitively, this sentence has a true reading. But this true reading is hard to
account for on the theory of section 2: since the trace which is the subject of “is
as big as Jupiter” and the one which is the subject of “orbits the sun as fast as
Mars” are coreferential, in the system of that section they will be forced to be
associated with the same sense.
Extended Believe, however, once again allows a straightforward way of han-
dling this datum. In contexts where a transformation which is salient relative to
John maps the thought expressed by the complement clause on an assignment to
the thought expressed by “Hesperus is as big as Jupiter and Phosphorus orbits
the sun as fast as Mars”, the sentence will have a true reading.
As I mentioned earlier, an important objection to this way of extending the
account is that it is fairly unconstrained. Transformations themselves are very
flexible, since they can map a thought to any other thought which determines the
same intensional proposition.35 Moreover, I have not said anything about how
a given backstory or environment might make some transformations salient as
opposed to others. This latter question is especially urgent since, as I emphasized
in connection to 15 and 16, the theory requires that different transformations
are salient in different contexts.
One way of strengthening the account would be to impose a further con-
straint on which transformations can be supplied by context. Say that a trans-
formation t is a translation if and only if (i) for any elementary sense (i.e. sense
of an elementary expression) m, ∆(t(m)) = ∆(m) and (ii) t(f⊕x) = t(f)⊕t(x).
The idea would then be that context supplies a more restrictive relation between
35This objection may be particularly concerning for for Fregans who take the first-coordinate
of the semantic values of sentences to be truth-values (as opposed to intensional propositions),
since in that case the fact that the relevant mappings must be transformation functions does
very little to constrain which readings are available.
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people and translations in context, not merely between people and transforma-
tions.36
Constraints like this one are worth exploring further as a way of winnowing
down the readings our Fregean allows. But I am not sure that this constraint
is the correct one. One reason for doubt is that it is incompatible with our
treatment of 19 above. The transformation I appealed to there must not be
a translation; it must map the two “occurrences” of the sense associated with
the planet Venus to different senses (in one case, a sense of Mars, and in the
other a sense of Jupiter). There are other tools which might be used to handle
that example, but in my view the most promising way of doing so introduces
other dimensions of flexibility (and hence lack of predictive power) which are as
worrying as the kind of flexibility this new constraint was designed to avoid.37
Other than to say that this constraint does not seem to me the right one, I
do not have a general answer to the question of how Fregeans should make their
theory more predictive. I do, however, believe that the fact that we do not yet
have a predictive account of which transformations are salient in context should
not bar us from exploring this theory further. On the contrary, investigating
how Fregeans might further constrain the theory presented here seems to me an
important line of future research.
Appendix B Sophisticated movement
The goal of this appendix is to develop Fregean accounts of third readings which
rely on sophisticated forms of movement.38
36This requirement is, in effect imposed by Richard [1990]. Richard does not give an explicit
treatment of abstraction, making it hard to compare his theory with mine directly. But in
addition to the fact that Richard imposes this extra requirement on transformations, there is
one important difference between our two theories, namely, that Richard’s lexical entry has
“believe” operate (essentially) on pairs of first-coordinates and second-coordinates.
Chalmers [2011, p. 618] similarly gives a related account (B′′) of simple attitude ascriptions.
But again, when it comes to quantifying in (§8) he gives some sentence-level paraphrases
without a systematic treatment, making it hard to situate his account with respect to how it
handles abstraction.
37Here are two alternative treatments. First, one could hold that there are senses s such
that John stands in the think-relation to thought produced by substituting s in for the senses
of “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” in the thought expressed by “Hesperus is as big as Jupiter
and Phosphorus orbits the sun as fast as Mars”, maybe the distinctive de re sense described in
n. 33. Second, following Santorio [2014] and Barker [2016], one could postulate that variables
have not one but two indices. We let h be not just a function from individuals to senses, but a
function from individuals to functions from indices to senses, so that for all traces ti,j , and all
g, h we assume that Jti,jKg,h = 〈g(i), h(g(i))(j)〉 and for all i and j ∆(h(g(i)(j))) = g(i). We
then say that the two occurrences of traces bound under “thinks” in 19 have distinct second
indices. This move allows us to say that, even though they are assigned to the same individual
(because their first index is the same, and this is all that g is sensitive to), h can still assign
them distinct senses. This approach would require some extra assumptions to ensure that
changes in the labeling of bound variables would not make a difference to the semantic value
of the sentence.
38A broadly “sophisticated movement approach” is that of “split intensionality” (Keshet
[2008, 2010, 2011]). On this approach, a third scope is postulated for attitude verbs such that
if a determiner moves to this scope, its quantificational force will be interpreted under the
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On the simplest of these theories – which will be the main focus of the
appendix – the predicate “winner” is assumed to be able to move out of the
scope of “John believes”, and the system is altered in such a way that if this
expression moves it denotes not the property of being a winner, but the rigid
property of belonging to the set or plurality of the actual winners (or, at least,
the winners in the relevant world of evaluation). Given these assumptions, our
sentence would have the (rough) paraphrase “being an actual winner is an F
such that John believes two F s lost”.
Formally, we develop this idea as follows. We use a slightly different semantics
than the one introduced in section 2; in particular we now use a world-indexed
denotation function J·Kw,g,h. Many expressions (e.g. names, e-type variables)
have the same world-indexed denotation as the non-world indexed denotation
they had in the old system. But expressions whose semantic values had world-
sensitive first coordinates, for instance, predicates, are now handled somewhat
differently. Predicates are still thought of as assigned functions from individuals
to worlds to truth-values by the lexicon (think of this as the first coordinate of
a “pre-semantic value”), but for a predicate α which is assigned such a function
f in the lexicon, π1(JαKw,g,h) = λx.f(x)(w) for every g, h, and w. In words,
the first coordinate of the world-indexed semantic value of such an expression is
given by saturating the second argument of the function assigned it by the lex-
icon with its world-index, yielding instead a function from individuals to truth-
values. Higher-type expressions (e.g. determiners) have lexical entries altered in
the obvious way to reflect the fact that their arguments are now extensions, as
opposed to intensional properties. When the meaning of an expression (such as
a modal operator, or an attitude verb) requires an intensional property as its
argument, the type-mismatch between it and its argument is repaired by the
introduction of an abstraction over the world index where it is needed (as in
the “Intensional Function Application” of Heim and Kratzer [1998, pg. 308]).
To produce an intensional proposition as the asserted content of an utterance
of a sentence, we also require that abstraction over the world-index occurs at
the head of the sentence.
We still assume that ∆ maps the senses of predicates not to extensions, but
to intensional properties. In particular, we assume that the sense of a predicate
is mapped by ∆ to the intensional property which it is assigned by the lexicon
(what I earlier called its “pre-semantic value”). In general this means that while
Intensional Function Application is needed to repair type mismatches in the
first coordinates of the semantic values of attitude reports, no corresponding
special rule is needed for second coordinates; we assume that the abstraction over
world-indices we have been discussing has no effect on the second coordinates
of sentences.
Our target syntax for the intended reading of 3 will be:
attitude verb, while its attitudinal status is fixed by the world of evaluation of the attitude
verb. It seems to me an interesting question whether Fregeans can develop a version of this








The rules just described will force there to be abstraction over worlds both
immediately beneath “believes”, and at the head of the sentence, but these are
not marked syntactically. The abstraction below “winners” (marked by 5e→t)
has type e→ t – where t is the type of truth values – as opposed to e→ p, be-
cause in our new system the first coordinates of the semantic values of predicates
are extensions, not intensional properties. This fact will be crucial to achieving
our desired result: if the first coordinate of the semantic value of “winner” were
an intensional property (as in the original system), and if the binder were over
a trace of type e → p, then the first coordinate of the semantic value of the
syntax above would be the same as that of the syntax where no movement had
occurred at all. In the system of this appendix, by contrast, “winners” supplies
an extension for the trace inside the scope of “believes”, and this extension
is not shifted by the world-abstraction beneath “believes”, allowing a different
interpretation of the sentence on the syntax where the predicate has moved.
One might have hoped that we could simply re-use the clause for abstraction
over individuals here for abstraction over extensions. But since we want h to
produce not a sense of an extension, but a sense of an intensional property for
the trace 5e→t, we need to modify the clause for the first coordinate slightly:
Property Predicate Abstraction If α is a branching node with daughters β
and γ, where β dominates only a numerical index ie→t of type e→ t, then
for any assignment functions g and h,
(a) π1(JαKw,g,h) = λF.π1(JγKw,g[F/i],h[h(λw.λx.F (x)(w))/F ]).
(b) π2(JαKw,g,h) = lambda-ie→p ⊕ π2(JγKg,h[ie→p/g(ie→t)])
The key new features are in clause (a). We simply set the value of h on the
relevant extension to its value on the rigid property which returns that extension
at every world. In the second clause, we assume that the sense lambda-i and
the corresponding trace-sense i have type e→ p because, as discussed above, we
still assume that senses have the types used for them in section 2. This clause
produces the truth-conditions described informally in the main text.
von Fintel and Heim [2002, 8.3.2 Way 1] also suggest a different sophisti-
cated movement approach, which is in some ways more attractive than the one
just described. On this approach, the whole determiner phrase “two winners”
is assumed to move, as it does in the simple movement strategy. But unlike in
the simple movement strategy, it is assumed that the phrase can move leaving
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behind a trace of its own type, i.e. ((e → t) → t), not of type e. As in the
predicate movement approach just described, this approach is implemented in a
setting with a world-indexed denotation function, designed so that the first co-
ordinate of the semantic value of the higher-order trace is not the world-variable
denotation of the original determiner phrase, but instead a rigid “extension” of
the type of the determiner phrase. The resulting syntax is thus interpreted as
roughly “Two actual winners is a Q such that John believes Q lost.” This “para-
phrase” is hard to interpret directly, but the effect is to closely approximate the
truth-conditions of the predicate movement approach. Since the whole Q is rein-
terpreted underneath “John believes”, the truth-conditions do not require that
there be two particular winners which John believes lost; as we might put it,
the quantificational force of “two winners” is interpreted below “believes”. But,
since the expression has undergone movement, the predicate “winners” is inter-
preted outside the scope of “believes”, and thus interpreted from the speaker’s
perspective, not from the attitude holder’s.
We can implement this strategy straightforwardly by modifying the “Predi-
cate Abstraction” rule just given to apply to the type of determiner-phrases.
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